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This study is designed both as a case study and a literature-based policy analysis 
to assist interested parties in gaining a better understanding of controversial “narco-
terrorism” phenomenon.  The objectives of this study are to show the existing connection 
between some terrorist organizations and drug trafficking to provide academic 
information about and explanations for terrorism and drug trafficking, to critically 
analyze the biases of many current narco-terrorism doctrines and to offer a 
comprehensive and neutral typology that elucidates all types of narco-terrorism. 
This thesis is presented in four parts.  The first part includes an introduction to 
narco-terrorism and provides a historical background of drug dilemma and terrorism.  A 
number of definitional and conceptual arguments constituting the backbone of the study 
are laid out in the second part of the study.  Third part consists of case studies of three 
different insurgent groups. An analysis of the information uncovered and presented in 
previous chapters and a typology of narco-terrorism are provided in the last part.  Thesis 
is concluded with recommendations in an attempt to inspire useful policies for 
individuals or institutions operating on the field.   
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Terrorism and the drug problem pose an enormous threat to the stability of the 
modern world.  While both have moved to the forefront of the world’s agenda during the 
early part of the twentieth century, they have each existed in varying forms and degrees 
throughout history.  The drug phenomenon especially has played important part in world 
politics due to modern advances in international transportation and communication 
capabilities. A short review of historical development of the drug issue in world politics 
and a consideration of the enormous economic potential would shed light on the ways in 
which the drug trade could potentially foster organized crime groups and terrorist 
organizations. 
The Drug Problem 
Human beings have always consumed drugs for social, curative, holy and dietary 
purposes. They used wine, tobacco, opium, marijuana, coffee, betel, coca, kava, gat, 
hallucinogens and many other drugs that predate history to keep themselves awake, 
lessen pain and increase virility (McAllister, 2000). China and several European 
countries obtained the drug opium from Western Asia until late pre-modern period.  
Merchants who traded internationally predominantly carried rare metals, minerals, luxury 
items, slaves, and exotic crops or products.  Among these exotics were rare tree bask and 




shipped thousands of miles to lands where they did not grow, their rarity ensuring an 
extremely high profit margin. 
Ironically, the opium was very easy to cultivate and opium was fairly easy to 
produce.  However, the secret of how to grow the poppy plant was very well guarded.  As 
a consequence, countries like China poured an enormous amount of money into the 
importing of opium until it finally began to produce opium locally around 1820.  Britain, 
however was able to capitalize on the opium market and, as consequence, owes a great 
deal of its imperial power to the trade of opiates (Trocky, 1999). 
At the beginning of twentieth century, numerous factors brought the drug problem 
to the attention of the Western Government leaders.  Pharmacological improvements led 
to more powerful drugs, peaking the interest of the commercial industry.  However, 
several grassroots organizations, including many American Protestant groups, moved to 
ban both recreational drugs and alcohol entirely, claming that drugs and alcohol use 
transforms people into violent criminals (McAllister, 2000). However, movements such 
as the anti-opium campaign in the United States and England at the turn of the twentieth 
century had the dual effect of discriminating against unwanted Eastern immigrants.  
Similarly, reform actions within China had ulterior motives as well (McLemore & Rome, 
1998; Taylor, 1969). 
Developments in agricultural and pharmacological science and a burgeoning 
global marketplace helped to produce new substances which were widely available.  The 




leaves’ arrival in Europe, still fresh due to efficient shipping techniques, cocaine use for 
both medical and abusive purposes increased sharply. 
Before the early twentieth century, Western nations did not give much thought to 
drug-related problems.  This laissez-faire approach toward drug use enabled drug 
consumption levels to increase and allowed a rise in the popularity of home-remedies 
over medical science.  However, once the negative affects of the abuse of drugs such as 
cocaine became apparent, Westerners began to approach the drug problem with concern.  
The decision to be made was not whether to regulate drugs, rather how much regulation 
should there be. 
The negative side effects of cocaine and opiate addiction became a hot political 
topic.  Social reform groups took up the cause of drug control both for the sake of 
eradicating drugs and to further their own agendas, using the drug issue to gain the public 
ear.  Often led by fundamentalist Protestant women, these reform groups touted public 
heath care, child welfare, social work and self-control.  In the early twentieth century, 
several organizations, both public and private, began to show an open desire to organize a 
multi-national effort to combat the drug trade (McAllister, 2000). 
The first international conference on drugs, The Shanghai Opium Commission 
(1909) was organized by the United States (US).  There are three main reasons the 
American arranged the Shanghai Opium Commission.  First, Americans had never been 
involved in the opium trade with China mainly due to moral and religious objections.  
Western missionaries shaped American perception of China.  Americans, like many 




their culture as immoral and inferior.  Secondly, Americans hoped that the Chinese 
government and people would abandon their long-term enemy Europeans and favor the 
US with profitable trade arrangements like those between China and several Western 
nations.  Lastly Americans were worried about opium because of addiction problems in 
their Pacific Island colonies, namely the Philippines.  Spain, who formerly controlled the 
Islands, was selling opium to the US islands for revenue as many other European nations, 
even though Americans were characterized by uprightness by the time (Meyer, and 
Parssinen, 1998). 
Americans were not satisfied with the result of Shanghai Opium Commission due 
to the failure of the nations to solidify an agreement.  This inadequacy gave a birth to The 
Hague Opium Conference and Convention (1911-1912).  Only eight months after the 
Shanghai Commission met, the US sent invitations for the Hague Conference to the same 
countries who had been in Shanghai.  Americans justified this invitation by stressing their 
own drug problem and the need for international cooperation to overcome the problem, as 
no country could overcome it by itself (Taylor, 1969). 
After these initial attempts to organize international cooperation to solve the drug 
dilemma, no significant steps were taken toward an effective multinational effort until 
after World War II.  In the 1960s, the US, now a major world power, and a big portion of 
the international community realized that there was still no serious and comprehensive 
multinational plan to squash the drug problem.  The United Nations then generated its 
most famous, and perhaps the most regulatory treaties.  The 1961, 1971 and 1988 United 




against the drug problem.  The 1961 Single Convention intended to eliminate the 
illegitimate production of drugs.  It also sought to regulate the legal production, 
manufacture, trade, distribution, and consumption of the drugs that are mainly derived 
from natural plants such as cocaine, heroine and marijuana. The Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and 1972 amendment protocol of Single Convention 
addressed the synthetic substances, creating provisions to regulate their trade, selling, 
distribution and stocking.  Finally, after the efforts of the first two convention proved 
lackluster, the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances revisited the issue of international regulations.  This last 
convention intended to improve international cooperation and encourage governments to 
take serious measures against the drug problem. It has since been instrumental in 
furthering the implementation of programs that effectively combat drug trafficking and 
abuse, programs that advocate judicial cooperation, the extradition of traffickers,  
controlled delivery and the action against the laundering of money derived from illicit 
drug trafficking (INCB Report, 1999). 
Despite national and international efforts, drugs use and trafficking still continue 
to invade everyday life.  According to the United Nations some 180 million people 
globally were consuming drugs in the late 1990s. This number includes 144 million 
consuming cannabis, 29 million people consuming amphetamines, 14 million people 
taking cocaine and 13 million people abusing opiates, 9 million of whom were addicted 
to heroin (Global Illicit Drug Trends, 2001). The United States is the largest single 




a total population of 260 million (U.N., 1998). Many millions more take part in the 
supply side of the drug trade by producing, trafficking, and distributing illicit drugs.  
The trade in illegal drugs is a multi-billion dollar global business.  The World 
Drug Report of United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) notes that the total 
revenue accrued to date in the illicit drug industry ranges from 300 billion to 500 billion 
dollars, nonetheless, a full eight percent of total international trade. In other words, the 
drug trade is bigger than international trade of iron, steel and motor vehicles.   
This international illicit economy has developed its own underground 
organizations.  The Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice 
(DEA) indicates that international organized crime organizations from a variety of 
countries control every stage of illicit drug trade from production to final street-level sale. 
International terrorist groups also use the structure of these trafficking networks as their 
organizational model. They control their employees very rigidly, utilizing a highly 
compartmentalized cell structure that keeps the divide production, shipment, distribution, 
money laundering, communications, security, and recruitment phases all separate from 
one another, each cell operating independently with no knowledge of the other cells.  
Drug trafficking organizations are capable of purchasing the most advanced 
transportation and communication technologies including sophisticated aircraft, land and 
water vessels, sonar, and radar.  They may also have an arsenal of weapons and soldiers 
to use them.  They have established vast counterintelligence capabilities and 
transportation networks.  Current international crime networks are harder to combat than 




inclination toward violence and have a more sophisticated operating strategy than past 
networks.  Today’s groups often corrupt whole governments in order to utilize entire state 
institutions.  Previously, organized crime groups simply moved to corrupt individuals 
such as such as police officers and judges (DEA, 2001). 
Terrorism 
Terrorism, on the other hand, is a more controversial issue than the drug problem.  
Its political nature makes it difficult to adequately define.  On occasion, an author may 
attempt to define terrorism.  However, such an attempt is often followed by a disclaimer 
about the possible existence of other definitions.  There are hundreds of definitions of 
terrorism.  There is simply no standard.  However the following definitions are useful due 
to their academic and institutional nature.  First, Wardlaw (1989, p.16) offers this 
definition with the belief that a globally accepted definition of terrorism must contain the 
concept of individual inspiration, social setting, and political rationale as well as general 
behavioral description:  
“Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence, by an 
individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to 
established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme 
anxiety and/or inducing effects in a target group larger than the 
immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into 
acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.” 
 
This is a very comprehensive definition, but it restricts terrorism to political terrorism.   
Other definitions state that terrorism is not a tactic for only insurgencies or 
revolutionaries but also is a tactic employed by some states.  Consider the following 




“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives” (FBI, 2001).  The institutional perspective of the FBI does not 
differentiate dramatically from academic perspectives.  However, the FBI focuses on the 
legal and investigative dimensions of the problem while academia concentrates on the 
political and social consequences of the phenomenon.  
Terrorism dates as far back as drug problem.  Assassinations were common 
terrorist acts even in its infancy.  The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. can be 
considered as a terrorist act.  Caesar, the Roman emperor, was murdered for political 
gain.  This is terrorism by definition because today’s political scientists take assassination 
as a terror activity by defining it as the murder of the leader or another administrator of 
the state individually or as a group (Simonsen, 2000). 
The writings of Josephus Flavius provide information about other early organized 
terrorist groups, namely an extreme Jewish sect the Sicari.  The Sicari was arose to action 
after Roman invasion of Palestine.  They used the crowds of religious festivals to 
camouflage their attacks as they assaulted their rivals with sica, or “short blade” which 
was placed under their coats.  They were active mainly in urban areas, a direct contrast to 
other zealots who employed guerrilla warfare tactics against the Romans in rural areas. 
Reportedly, Sicari destroyed the fortress and archives of the Herodian dynasty and killed 
the renowned priest. 
Order of the Assassins was another influential radical terrorist group.  Hassan 




Islamic faction.  Initially, the Assassins were established in mountain fortresses.  They 
began by invading the fortress Alamut in 1090 and went on to many others, eventually 
expanding their terror to urban areas.  They killed many influential enemies, including 
the Sultan of Baghdad Nazim al Mulq, Count Raymond II of Tripoli in Syria, and the 
ruler of the Jerusalem Kingdom, Marquis Conrad of Montferrat.  They terrorized Persia, 
Syria and Palestine for a long time.  The Order of the Assassins was the first terrorist 
group in record to utilize disguises and suicide attacks to cripple their opponents. 
During the nineteenth century the Napoleonic Wars caused an emergence of 
guerilla warfare in Spain and Russia.  Italian and Irish patriots employed terrorism by 
their covert societies.  In many Balkan states, Turkey and Egypt several groups used 
terrorism as their primary operational strategy.   
Russia is certainly no stranger to terrorist activities.  Anarchies and the other 
opponents of the Russian government used terrorist actions both as a propaganda tool and 
to reshape the Russian government altogether.  The murder of Tsar Alexander II in 
March 1881 was on of the most important terrorist attacks of the nineteenth century.  The 
assassination was carried out by the Narodya Volya, or “the People’s Will.”   Boevaya 
Organisatsia or “Fighting Organization” was another active Russian terrorist 
organization.  
The twentieth century also witnessed many terrorist organizations and activities.  
Armenian terrorists carried out a three step terrorist campaign against the Turks, which 
continued until 1980s.  The IMRO, or Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, can be 




Bulgarian Government.  The Black Hundred of Russia, Croatian Ustasha and Rumanian 
Iron Guard are examples that predate World War II.  After the war, terrorist activity 
moved from Europe to Middle East and Asia.  Terrorism showed itself as guerilla 
movements in agrarian cultures, however took place in inner cities in urban societies.  
Israeli terrorist groups such as the Irgun and Stern Gang, Tuparamos of Uruguay, Red 
Army of Germany, the Red Brigades of Italy, IRA of Ireland and the ETA of Spain are 
all examples of twentieth century terrorist organizations.  
The growing use and impact of nationally sponsored terrorism sparkled endless 
discussions among European Leftist groups about the validity and morality of terrorism.  
Many of the chief leftists refused to utilize terrorism preferring open armed force.  
However, two German philosophers, Karl Heintzen and Johann Most, disagreed.  They 
believed assassinations to be a political must.  They both moved to the United States from 
Germany and continued to be theorists of terrorism.  Heintzen saw improved technology 
and weapons of mass destruction to be the key for achieving revolution.  Johann Most in 
his New York newspaper Freiheit, turned out to be the most effective anarchist organ.  
He also believed in the effectiveness and necessity of violence, advocating the 
development of mass destruction weapons.  Freiheit writings were the inspiration for The 
Anarchist Cookbook, published by the American New Left in the 1960s.  To this day, the 
Cookbook is the standard text for terrorists (Laqueur, 1999).   
Drug-Terrorism Nexus 
As mentioned earlier, neither the drug phenomenon nor terrorism are new issues.  




fairly new issue.  Drug related terrorism, or “narco-terrorism” is usually considered to 
take one of two forms.  First, terrorist organizations may be directly involved in drug 
related activities by producing, trafficking, and distributing illegal drugs. On the other 
hand, narco-terrorism may occur when drug trafficking organizations use terrorist tactics, 
such as assassinations, bombings and kidnappings.  In either case, the goal of the narco-
terrorist groups is to generate revenue.  The only difference between a terrorist-based 
group and a drug-trafficking based group is their final objective.  While terrorist groups 
seek monetary gains to finance their violent political activities, drug trafficking networks 
reach their final destination when they exchange their illegal drugs with money.   
Nonetheless, types of narco-terrorism are not restricted with these two.  Further in this 
paper, a comprehensive typology of narco-terrorism will be provided.  
Another important aspect of narco-terrorism is its political nature.  While certain 
organizations are considered “terrorist” by some countries, others name them freedom 
fighters, guerillas or insurgents.  These are purely semantic arguments and complicate 
efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking and international terrorism.  For example, in 
Turkey, which is a very hot spot for both terrorism and drug trafficking, during the 1980s 
and 1990s several drug seizures in Turkey and many other European countries pointed 
toward a connection between the terrorist organization Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
and an international drug trafficking ring.  It was proven that all of these drug traffickers 
were PKK militants.  Nevertheless, many European governments did not consider the 
PKK to be a terrorist organization in spite of millions of heroin addicts of their own and 




respective European countries, after the PKK established its smuggling network in 
Europe, and after thousands of pages of evidentiary documentation, some European 
countries finally banded the PKK’s activities. Walter Laqueur (1999) notes in his 
writings that the involvement of the PKK in drug trafficking is unequivocally proven by a 
substantial amount of evidence before its activities were banned.   
The recent terrorist attacks in New York on the World Trade Center and in 
Washington D.C. against the Pentagon showed that the political agendas of governments 
that play “Your Terrorist is My Freedom Fighter” game may devastatingly compromise 
national and international security.  
The term “narco-terrorism” is even less well defined than “terrorism.”  Due to 
clandestine and illegal nature of narco-terrorist groups, there is little opportunity for 
academicians to attain information about them.  Many authors emphasize this lack of 
first-hand intelligence, and note that this lack may lead to falsely identifying as narco-
terrorist groups that have nothing to do with drug trafficking.  They also stress that some 
governments may have much to gain by falsely accusing such groups. 
Because it occurs in a variety of forms, it is difficult to provide a universal 
definition of narco-terrorism.  However, a working definition of narco-terrorism would 
be helpful to establish a basis for discussion.  In that vein, narco-terrorism can be 
described as simply a group action that combines terrorism with some aspect of the 
narcotics trade.   
Narco-terrorism exists in several forms.  It may manifest itself as the direct or 




terrorism may consist of the employment of terrorist-like tactics by drug trafficking 
organizations.  Governments can “commit” narco-terrorism by supporting terrorist 
organizations that smuggle illicit drugs, or by secretly controlling the drug trade through 
governmental agencies.  Governments may even secretly use their own resources to 
traffic drugs for the purpose of obtaining financial power or destabilizing enemy 
societies.  
Methodology 
Purpose of This Study and Questions 
This study will attempt to provide a comprehensive and neutral typology of narco-
terrorism by explaining the characteristics and methods of operation for known narco-
terrorist organizations.  Narco-terrorism, as a term, was born in Latin America due to 
allegations that political insurgent groups were participating in illicit drug trafficking.  
For this reason, a secondary purpose of this study will be to analyze three of the most 
important Latin American insurgent groups: (a) the Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning 
Path); (b) the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (the FARC); and (c) the 19th of 
April Movement (the M-19).  A basic historical background of these groups, their 
methods of raising funds, their ideology, their overall strategies and “battlefield” tactics, 
and the financial structure of their organizations will be explored.  The overarching goal 
of this research is to uncover as much information about narco-terrorism as possible in an 
effort to understand and explore the various academic and governmental approaches that 




 The objectives of this study are to show the existing connection between some 
terrorist organizations and drug trafficking to provide academic information about and 
explanations for terrorism and drug trafficking, to critically analyze the biases of many 
current narco-terrorism doctrines and to offer a comprehensive typology that elucidates 
all types of narco-terrorism.  
There are varieties of matters that need to be clarified in order to obtain a better 
understanding of political and economic dimensions of narco-terrorism. With this mind, 
the following research questions are proposed: 
1. What is narco-terrorism?  Is it a term that was born due to an actual 
connection between terrorism and drug trafficking? Is it just a myth 
created by repressive governments to eliminate groups that threaten the 
existing political system and its institutions?     
2. Is there a relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking? If so, to 
what extent does this interaction occur?  What the concrete evidence 
supports this thesis?  Where in the world are narco-terrorism cases 
monitored intensively?    
3. How are revolutionary insurgent groups involved in the illegal drug 
trade? Despite their official condemnation of it, why do some of those 
groups still engage in the illicit drug business?  Do they only collect 
taxes for “protecting” drug traffickers or do they go beyond this?   
4. Why do some drug trafficking organizations employ terrorist-like 




terrorist methods simply to deter, terrify and intimidate people who 
pose a threat to their lucrative business?  Should this be called as narco-
terrorism?   
Methodology and Methodological Problems 
This study is designed both as a case study and a literature-based policy analysis 
to assist interested parties in gaining a better understanding of a highly controversial 
“narco-terrorism” phenomenon.  Methodological problems that are more effective in 
studies that focus on politically infected and structurally inconsistent subjects are also 
common on this study.  The concepts of narco-terrorism, drug trafficking and terrorism 
are more difficult to research in comparison to many other social science matters.  
Conventional and widely accepted scientific research techniques are not always 
applicable when searching terrorism and drug trafficking.  For surveys, field research, 
and personal interviews are next to impossible in most instances due the dangerous and 
secretive nature of the subjects.  Because of this dilemma, courageous journalists rather 
that academicians conduct nearly all of the field research.  In general, previous studies 
have shown that any researcher who wishes to perform academic research on these 
subjects will confront serious methodological obstacles due to the confidential nature of 
the cases that may be the subject of study.  These difficulties may be manufactured by 
either the criminals themselves or by state officials who wish to conceal detail of their 
investigations for security or political reasons.  It is very difficult, therefore, to establish 




Almost all literature that is reviewed in this study was created by analyzing 
existing literature or secondary data.  This is not because of the researcher’s 
unwillingness to employ other methods; rather because concrete and reliable data on 
narco-terrorism is practically nonexistent due to the illegal, clandestine and political 
nature of the phenomenon.  Virtually no records are generated during the interaction, 
transaction, communication, or operation phases of terrorist and drug trafficking 
organization because of possible legal ramifications.  The political nature of narco-
terrorism is also a drawback for the researcher.  Many books, articles, and reports are 
written in a biased manner. 
Even though accurate data on narco-terrorism is almost nonexistent, there is good 
amount of information about drug trafficking and terrorism, which are fundamental 
prerequisites for narco-terrorism.  For example, research on the drug trafficking issue 
may reveal useful data regarding governmental drug seizures, trafficking routes, 
production and consumption zones, trafficking and abuse trends, arrested drug traffickers, 
infiltrated trafficking organizations, and so on. Besides a variety of books and articles 
there are several other sources for this kind of data.  Governmental institutions created to 
combat drug problem usually collect and organize a great deal of useful and reasonably 
reliable data. The Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation are 
prime examples of this type of agency.  This study, when it necessary, will cite data from 
the publications of both of these agencies.  There are also international organizations that 
possess massive amounts of valuable information on the drug phenomenon. Most 




Programme (UNDCP), the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Interpol, the 
World Health Organization, and the World Customs Organization. There are also 
nongovernmental organizations and independent institutes that are engaged in drug-
related research, including the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction. Among these sources, for the purpose of this research, UNDCP and INCB 
data will be preferred.   
Data on terrorism, on the other hand, is more qualitative than quantitative.  In fact, 
books and articles on terrorism frequently have plainly evident biases.  Moreover, unlike 
the drug issue, there is no active international organization that may be used as a source 
of neutral data.  However, there are a few national administrations that have valuable data 
on the issue. Nevertheless, it may not be easy to obtain such information from these 
national administrations.  Most importantly, an enormous amount of scholarly thought on 
terrorism exists, providing precious information and intellectual explanations of 
terrorism.  The researcher may obtain historical, ideological, philosophical, political, and 
structural information about terrorism in general or about a terrorist organization in 
particular.  Books used in this study are mainly the books that are considered to be the 
premier works on the subject of terrorism.  The issues within drug trafficking and 
terrorism will be compared and combined with the intention of gaining an understanding 
of how the two work together. 
Regarding narco-terrorism, there is a great difficulty finding valid sources on the 
drug-terrorism/insurgency nexus.  Because of the political nature of the problem, highest 




popular and effective propaganda tool for both insurgents and governments.  Its 
subjective nature leaves data about narco-terrorism open for abuse by either side.  The 
data may early be manipulated to benefit the author’s cause.  To avoid bias, a cross 
validation of the literature has been attempted by checking the allegations made in one 
work with several other sources.  This process requires the use of a broad selection of 
sources, a feat that has been attempted in spite of an extreme deficiency of sources.  This 
study is based on analyzing existent literature or secondary data.  I will refer to scholarly 
articles and books on the subject as well as information complied by international 
organizations, national institutions, non-governmental organizations, media 
organizations, and the Internet.   
In this perspective, the research is predominantly library-based. It will entail a 
comprehensive literature review, which will provide an overview of current viewpoints in 
this area. This paper will be presented in four chapters.  In this, the first chapter, I have 
introduced narco-terrorism and have attempted to provide a historical background of drug 
the dilemma and terrorism having set forth two valid definitions of terrorism, one from 
academia and one from the field.  In Chapter Two, a number of definitional and 
conceptual arguments constituting the backbone of the study will be laid out by 
presenting and evaluating selected writings on the elemental concepts of the narco-
terrorism.  Chapter Three will consist of case studies of three different insurgent groups 
the Sendero Luminoso, the FARC, and the M-19.  It has been dedicated that a case study 
would be the best research method to use due to the elusive and the controversial nature 




Three and the typology of narco-terrorism will be provided in Chapter four. The study 
will be concluded with recommendations in an attempt to inspire useful policies for 
individuals or institutions operating on the field.  Recommendations are made under the 
light of ideas and data discussed mainly in second chapter, and with the help of my own 
experience on the field. 
Limitations to the Study 
The scarce availability of sources not only presents methodological problems, it 
presents limitations to the scope and depth of the study.  Due to the controversial nature 
of this topic, sources have been chosen with great care and consideration.  For example, 
studies written with for the sake of furthering an ideological agenda had to be eliminated 
despite the extremely limited amount of sources.  The inadequate amount of reliable 
academic work has necessitated the use of some governmental documents.  Occasionally 
these documents are lacking in scientific validity due to the inclination of some 
governments to hide real figures in order to present their own interests and 
accomplishments in a favorable light.  
While efforts to combat narco-terrorism are no more successful now than were 
fifteen tears ago, narco-terrorism does not attract researchers anymore.  Current articles 
that slightly mention the drug-terrorism connection are rare.  As a consequence the 
sources for this study are often ten or more years old.  The reason narco-terrorism has 
disappeared the world’s agenda despite its still prominent presence will be studied further 




  Another problem to be confronted is the limited amount of academically valid 
quantitative statistical data.  More or less every study in this field is generated by either 
analyzing preexisting literature or secondary data.  A tertiary analysis, then, of these 
sources poses difficulties when attempting to make constructive comparisons. The ability 
to create valuable statistical data using these methods is quite limited in comparison to 
























ELEMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSIONS 
Terrorism 
There are a variety of studies that attempt to explain matter of terrorism.  As 
mentioned earlier, the definitions of terrorism are as diverse as the authors who attempt to 
define it.   That having been said, Table 1 provides simple, thoughtful and useful 
definitions of various terrorism types.  
Table 1: White’s Definition of Terrorism (1991). 
  Type Definition 
Simple Violence or threatened violence intended to produce fear and change 
Legal Criminal violence violating legal codes and punishable by the state 
Analytical Specific political and social factors behind individual terrorist attacks 
State-sponsored Terrorist groups used by small states and the Communist Bloc to 
attack Western interests 
State Power of government used to terrorize its people into submission 
 
Brain Jenkins and Walter Laqueur each present a definition of terrorism.  Jenkins 
describes terrorism as the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about a 
political change. Laqueur calls terrorism the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political 
objective when innocent people are targeted. He adds that terrorism is a form of political 




while they do address the problem, are overly broad and do little to shed light on the 
problem.   
Other schools of thought focus on ‘legal definition’ of terrorism.  Legal 
definitions describe terrorism as a crime, a violation of law, and justify governmental 
action against terrorists as criminals who violate the law.  The legal approach, however, 
fails to take into consideration the social and political weaknesses inherent in a legal 
system of governance.  What is considered to be legal is often the direct result of which 
group is in power.  Hence, one side has the power to label behavior of its adversaries as 
illegal.  A group may be then named terrorist simply because its opponents are in power. 
Legal definitions are therefore not valid for every situation related to terrorism (White, 
1991). 
Alex Schmid (1983) tried to provide a comprehensive definition of terrorism by 
examining all existing literature that attempts to define terrorism.  At the end of his study, 
he came to the conclusion that there is not a final, distinct, and universal definition of 
terrorism.  A single definition would not be able to encompass all probable uses of the 
term.  However, in spite of this wide variety of definitions, terrorism in all its forms 
generally contains some common elements.  For instance, it is the target population who 
determines the essence of terrorism.  Victims are persons who are chosen for their 
symbolic value.  Violent terrorists use brutality against these victims to create a chronic 
state of fear among the public.  So, not only does the immediate victim suffer, the 




“What the terrorist does is kill, maim, kidnap, and torture.”  William J. Casey 
(1986, p.3) approaches the question with an uninflected description.  He continues by 
stating that anyone can be a victim of terrorism. They do not have to have a particular 
political identity.  Children, civilians, politicians, or diplomats can be attacked and 
violence is the primary tool that terrorists prefer to use. 
Some other scholars propose that revolutionary violence should not be correlated 
with terrorism.  Crenshaw (1983) argues that before calling an event as “terrorism,” the 
target, the act, and the political success should be examined.  According to Crenshaw 
‘freedom fighters’ should not be called terrorists because they only fight against despot 
states.  Terrorism is an act that is intended to achieve a psychological effect by using 
intolerable social and political violence against guiltless emblematic targets.  As 
discussed in the first chapter, this approach results in a “Your terrorist is my freedom 
fighter” conflict. None of the terrorist groups believe that they are actually terrorists; 
rather they believe they are revolutionaries or freedom fighters.   
Some authors attempt to address the issue of state-sponsored terrorism.  Benjamin 
Netanyahu (1987) calls state-sponsored terrorism an attack on western civilization.  He 
considers it to be a political crime and war against the people, in which society is 
threatened with chaos and killings.  Livingstone (1986) limited Netanyahu’s definition to 
America.  He believes that terrorism is nothing but the method the Warsaw Pact states 
use to employ terror against America (Livingstone & Arnold, 1986). 
The violent applications of repressive governments may also be called terrorism.  




terrorism to maintain these existing systems.  The continuous efforts by these states to 
pressure the existing political structure strongly resemble the tactics of terrorism.  
Abusing their power by committing unlawful arrests, murders, and torture these Latin 
American states acted no different than the insurgents that they call terrorists. 
Because there is no consensus over a single conclusive definition of terrorism, 
some social scientists focus on creating a typology of terrorism.  Paul Wilkinson (1974) 
justifies his efforts to classify terrorism by indicating that terrorism has a dynamic 
structure and therefore need a situational definition.  He divides terrorism into two main 
categories: criminal and political terrorism.  The criminal terrorist seeks either personal 
psychological satisfaction or monetary success. On the other hand, political terrorism 
manifests itself in different forms. Political terrorism may be State-sponsored, 
Repressionist, Nationalist, or Revolutionary.  Revolutionary terrorism is generally 
employed in attempt to establish a new political ideology using violence to change or 
overthrow the existing political ideology.  Some governments use Repressionist policies 
to terrorize their own citizens in order to gain authority.  Others attack other states using 
terrorist modus operandi. Nationalistic terrorism either seeks political independence from 
an imperial authority or fights for a change in the ethnic make-up of the existing 
government. 
In his book “Transnational Terror” Bell (1975) provides a comprehensive model 
that divides terrorism into six parts (Table 2).  Bell (1978) mainly focuses on 
Revolutionary terrorism in his other book “A Time of Terror”.  Revolutionary terrorist 




members. They frighten group members into obedience and punish their own members 
when they fail to follow group policies.    They have a great desire to maintain public 
support, so they use tactics that keep their members well under control.   
Revolutionary terrorist organizations also employ what Bell (1978) calls 
“functional” terror to achieve these objectives.  Functional terror is used to create the 
impression that the government is to weak to handle the threat.  This functional terror 
consists of the terrorist organization launching continuous assaults against random or 
chosen targets.  They provoke states to take action that represses the public.  These 
repressive actions, in turn, are seen as justification for their violent attacks against 
governmental targets. They manipulate every occasion possible to spur dramatic 
confrontations.  “Manipulative” terror involves the use of hostages or assets to gain 
desired media attention, political power, or physical resources. They intended to force the 
legal authority into some sort of surrender.   
Table 2: Bell’s Typology of Terrorism       
Types Purpose 
Psychotic Psychological Gratification 
Criminal Profit 
Vigilante Retaliation 
Endemic Internal Struggle 
Authorized State Repression 
Revolutionary Behavioral Change Through Fear  
Source: Transnational Terror 
The practice of attacking targets with no strategic importance or committing an 




“symbolic” terror (Bell, 1978).  A completely comprehensive understanding of 
revolutionary terror will help elucidate describe the character of terrorism. 
Drug Trafficking and Abuse 
The drug problem consists of two essential parts: drug abuse and drug trafficking.  
Unlike terrorism and narco-terrorism, defining the problem is not an issue. There is a 
common acceptance of what the problem is.  However, scholars disagree on how to solve 
this problem.     
Today, the illegal drug trade is a global phenomenon.  It is a huge problem that 
has strong side effects.  It has a negative influence on the economics, politics, and social 
structures of society.  In spite of a number of efforts to control it, the international illicit 
drug market is still growing globally and the numbers of accessible illegal drugs are 
increasing continuously.  It is one of the largest enterprises in the world.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments reports that Europeans and 
Americans waste nearly $122 billion annually on the most commonly used drugs, namely 
heroin, cocaine and cannabis.  Moreover fifty to seventy percent of this money is 
laundered and diverted to other ventures.  If it is assumed that these numbers are 
accurate, a full three-fourths of the gross national income of the 207 economies of the 
world is smaller than profit earned through illegal substance trade (Stares, 1996).   
From another point of view, Jordan (1999) argues that the drug trade is simply a 
game governments play to achieve their own ends.  In the international arena illicit drug 




economic and strategic purposes. Second, smaller powers use the trade of illegal 
substances to fund a stronger defense for their fragile economies.  
It is important to consider the fact that while every year, thousands of tons of 
heroin, cocaine and marijuana, and billions of synthetic drugs are seized by law 
enforcement agencies of different countries, the overall amount of seized illegal drugs 
consists of only five percent of the total amount of drugs that move between the 
continents.  The drug enforcement administrations that can seize more that five percent 
are considered successful.  This evaluation may appear illogical, however no country has 
done better despite the billions of dollars spent to control drug trafficking since the fight 
began.  Moreover, especially in the western, so called “consuming” countries, drug abuse 
and addiction to hard drugs boosted dramatically after the 1960s.  The number of deaths 
due to overdose, increased significantly.  The governments of drug-troubled countries 
now have to arrange their budgets according to the level of their drug problem.  In both 
rehabilitation and law enforcement phases, billions of dollars have been spent and many 
billions more will probably be spent in the near future. The traffickers; no matter their 
nationality or race, will continue to smuggle drugs and distribute them because of the 
extremely high profit.  A kilogram of heroin that can be purchased for fifteen thousand 
dollars from its source may bring nearly a million dollars in the United States in street 
level. There is no other business transaction that can make the same revenue.  This kind 





The United States have been major consumers of illicit drugs for quite some time.  
It forms the largest consumption zone.  The National Drug Control Strategy 2001 Annual 
Report (NDCSAR), is prepared by Office of National Drug Control Policy, and provides 
an assessment of current drug use and availability, the impact of drug use, and treatment.  
According to this report, in 1999, an estimated 14.8 million Americans twelve years of 
age and older were current illicit drug users, meaning they had used an illicit drug during 
the month prior to interview.  This number represents 6.7 percent of the population 
twelve and older. Drug use reached peak levels in 1979 when 14.1 percent of the 
population age twelve and over were current users. This figure declined significantly 
between 1979 and 1992, from 23 million to twelve million. Since 1992 the number of 
current users has gradually increased, with statistically insignificant changes occurring 
each year. An estimated 3.6 million people met diagnostic criteria for dependence on 
illegal drugs in 1999, including 800,000 youths between the ages of twelve and 
seventeen. 
Narco-terrorism 
Narco-terrorism consists of two provocative and controversial subjects.  Drug 
trafficking and terrorism are heavily affected by the politics of world powers.  According 
to some scholars, simply labeling a group as ‘terrorist’ results in negative and isolating 
consequences for the group.  The term ‘drug trafficker’ has equally negative 
connotations.  To label a group as both terrorist and drug trafficker, then, creates a doubly 
negative image for the group in the public eye.  Some governments will use the label 




neutralizing the group.  This action may be pure governmental calumny or the 
exaggeration of a few incidents (Wardlaw, 1989). 
Other authors, however, argue that practices either terrorism or drug trafficking 
should not be categorized as the victim of a political slander.  Exhibiting sympathy for a 
drug trafficker because he is incorrectly labeled ‘narco-terrorist’ is simply absurd.  To 
date, intellectual sympathy toward revolutionary or insurgent groups has made many 
scholars focus on governmental repressions techniques and international imperialistic 
policies.  This focus has put a positive pressure on administrations not to violate basic 
human rights, it also has resulted in support for terrorism and drug trafficking 
organizations.  Literature on this issue generally emphasizes the political aspects of 
narco-terrorism.  However, the labeling theory debate encourages the reader to look at 
both sides of the argument. 
Miller and Damask (1996) claim that the term ‘narco-terrorism’ has meaning both 
implicitly and explicitly.  Narco-terrorism has generated connotations beyond its own 
particularity and operational definitions.  Unfortunately, despite the legal magnetism of 
its two elements, narco-terrorism as a term does not convey a definitive understanding of 
what exactly it is.  Narco-terrorism initially was most likely a myth created by the Reagan 
administrations in order to serve his own drug policies.  Scholarly and popular literature 
gave it a space and it engaged its own reality.  At the beginning of its emergence, narco-
terrorism was presented as a simple conspiracy of drug traffickers.  The term served the 
interests of the Reagan organization’s foreign policies.  The following years witnessed an 




of the Reagan and subsequent Bush administrations to overcome narco-terrorism became 
a useful tool for their Democratic opponents. 
A distinctive approach to the narco-terrorism phenomenon is provided by Peter A. 
Lupsha (1989).  He outlines the precise theoretical distinctions inherent in the subject and 
tries to create a typology of narco-terrorism.  Lupsha, like many other scholars, 
acknowledged the vague and unclear nature of the term narco-terrorism.  He writes, “As a 
concept from which one can develop better models for understanding both drug 
trafficking and issues of insurgent conflict, ‘narco-terrorism’ is currently a badly defined 
and politically contaminated term.”  
 The definition of terrorism by Vice President Bush’s 1986 Task Force on 
Combating Terrorism constitutes the basis for Lupsha’s Type-I: True Narco-terrorism.  
This definition focuses on the criminality of terrorism and avoids political approaches 
that make one’s terrorist another’s freedom fighter.  True Narco-terrorism consists of the 
use of violence by drug traders to threaten governmental authority and state institutions.  
This is the only explanation that fully fits the denotative meaning of the term narco-
terrorism.   
When tainted governmental bodies, such as the police, military, politicians or 
bureaucrats perform terrorism to the advantage of drug traffickers, another type of narco-
terrorism occurs, Type Ia: State Surrogate Narco-terrorism.  Type-Ib: Insurgent 
Surrogate Narco-terrorism, occurs when insurgent groups behave as representatives of 
drug traffickers.  When the Colombian insurgent group the M-19 attacked the Colombian 




traffickers to United States, this group engaged in Type-Ib: Insurgent Surrogate Narco-
terrorist. 
Type II narco-terrorism, “Narco-Warfare” includes the cooperation between 
peasant cultivator and insurgents to fight against any administration that employs policies 
that threaten to eliminate or prohibit coca leaf cultivation, paste production, or refining.  
The last form of narco-terrorism is Insurgent Narco-terrorism, Type-III.  In this type of 
narco-terrorism insurgent groups are actually involved in active drug trafficking and they 
may employ terrorist tactics to protect their interests.  They may oversee the manufacture 
and distribution of cocaine in the areas that are under their control (Lupsha, 1989).  
Rachel Ehrenfeld (1990) defines narco-terrorism as “the use of drug trafficking to 
advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations.”  In general, 
she considers narco-terrorism to be a tactic of anti-capitalistic Marxist-Leninists who 
target the United States and other non-Marxist, democratic states in the Western 
hemisphere.  She argues that aside from generating revenue, the motivation behind narco-
terrorism is the destabilization of Western, democratic society, the US in particular.  
Ehrenfeld believes that the American administration should view take drug trafficking as 
a political attack on the Western civilization and should not treat it as an ordinary 
criminal activity.  Her study focuses on the cooperation between the state-sponsored 
international narcotics traffickers and international terrorist organizations that employ 
pro-Marxist tactics and strategies to undermine legal democratic states.  
James A. Inciardi (1991) addresses some questions that will aid in understanding 




type of political violence?  Does it involve any kind of violence regardless of its terrorism 
tag? Is it a common practice in producer countries or in consumer countries? Can this 
matter be systematically studied? Lastly and most importantly, is narco-terrorism a 
political concept or is it an economic concept?  Inciardi discusses this last question and 
concludes that narco-terrorism is an economic concept rather than a political one.  His 
justification for this conclusion offers some explanation of the term.  Narco-terrorism is 
not a new type of terrorism that was developed to counter the illegalization of drugs.  On 
the contrary narco-terrorism is more like a shorthand label that is used to identify the 
variety of organizations that connects violent terrorist action with the economics of the 
illicit drug business. 
There are two ways in which the drug-terrorism interaction Inciardi proposes are 
similar to those Lupsha.  First, Inciardi notes the violent intimidation techniques used by 
drug trafficking organizations that are considered narco-terrorism actions by journalists 
and state officials even though this violence ordinarily would not be considered typical 
terrorist activity.  This definition of narco-terrorism matches Lupsha’s Type I in which 
drug traders use violence to threaten governmental authority.  The actions of this type of 
narco-terrorism may include the murder of competing dealers and traffickers, as well as 
the murder or intimidation of informers or their family members, law enforcement 
officers, judges, and prosecutors.   
Secondly, according to Inciardi, insurgent groups and national governments 
become involved directly or indirectly with illicit drug trade in order to finance their 




Ib: Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorism.  These types of groups may extort money from 
peasants who grow opium poppies or coca leaves, grant protection safety to refining and 
smuggling organizations, directly produce and traffic illegal drugs, or maintain absolute 
control over drug-producing zones (Inciardi, 1991; Lupsha, 1989). 
MacDonald (1998) defines the drug-insurgency nexus as the formation of 
political-military territories that are controlled by drug traffickers who are allied with 
extreme leftist, revolutionary groups.  On the other hand, narco-terrorist groups utilize 
terrorist strategies, including assassinations and hostage-taking to provide protection to 
drug dealers, producers, and drug traffickers.  MacDonald maintains that the drug-
insurgency nexus is usually a “marriage of convenience” between drug traffickers and 
leftist insurgent groups.  This alliance does not necessarily mean that drug traffickers and 
insurgent groups share the same ideology.  In fact, while insurgent guerillas advocate 
radical changes in their society’s social and political structure, drug trafficking 
organizations generally benefit by maintaining the status quo. 
The narco-terrorist organizations in Colombia, however, had more to gain by 
overthrowing the government. The impact of the illegal drug business on Colombia’s 
political and socioeconomic system is substantial, because this trade is founded upon a 
marriage between drug lords and insurgents.  Leftists guerillas, who advocate either 
Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology worked hand-in-hand with drug barons to their 
mutual benefits.  A statement from the leader of the communist insurgent group M-19 
(19th of April Movement), according to MacDonald, makes clear the insurgent’s view on 




the country.  Ospina tolerates and supports the drug cartels activities as long as they pose 
a threat to the imperialistic state.  Their alliance with drug cartels also enabled Ospina 
and the M-19 to gather the financial power necessary to purchase weapons from Cuba 
and Nicaragua.  Moreover, the drug traffickers’ violent activities against the state 
weakened its control over illegal trade, and that resulted in a greater influx of drugs into 
the United States.  By increasing drug use in the US, the groups hope to destabilize the 
global leader of imperialism.   This undermining of the United States would in turn 
weaken the dependent capitalist government in Colombia, and thereby accelerating 
revolutionary to allow the guerillas to attain their long awaited triumph (MacDonald, 
1998).   
The assault on the Palace of Justice in downtown Bogotá in November 1985 
brought more attention to the terrorism-drug trafficking linkage.  The daring nature of the 
assault made self-evident the link between the M-19 guerillas and narcotraficantes.  
Further investigations indicated that this attack was conducted to stop the extradition of 
drug dealers to the United States. This incident will be examined in greater more detail in 
the following chapter.  
After studying three important Latin American Insurgency Groups, the Cuban and 
Bulgarian connections, the criminal violence/narco-terrorism interaction, and the effects 
of intense drug abuse and drug demand on narco-terrorism, Vetter and Perlstein (1991) 
came up with a definition that divides narco-terrorism into two parts: free-lance and state-
sponsored.  Free-Lance narco-terrorism indicates that some terrorist organizations, due to 




financial power.  This capital enables them to purchase guns, bribe government officials, 
obtain political power, and even take governments under control.  The Latin American 
Insurgent groups The Shinning Path, the FARC, and the M-19 are listed as examples of 
terrorist organizations that practice these behavior.  State sponsored narco-terrorism, on 
the other hand, usually comes in one of three forms: supporting of revolutionary groups, 
illegal drug traders, and arms smugglers by the states that seek destabilization and a 






































CASE EXAMPLES OF THE DRUG-INSURGENCY NEXUS 
Up to this point, this study has focused on theoretical and conceptual discussions 
and explanations of the drug-terrorism nexus.  This chapter, however, will present an in 
depth focus on three major terrorist/insurgent groups and their alleged involvement in the 
drug business.  These three groups are all based in South America, one in Peru and two in 
Colombia.  Other groups will be discussed in Chapter IV, but a greater emphasis will be 
placed here on the study of the Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning Path), the FARC 
(Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), and the M-19 (19th of April Movement).  
These three South American insurgent groups were chosen due to the fact that the term 
narco-terrorism was born in this region.  Terrorism has existed there for decades and it 
remains an extremely active terrorist region.  Furthermore, South America place of origin 
for the majority of the drugs that plague today’s societies.  Aside from its unique 
peculiarities, the Latin American drug-insurgency nexus exhibits characteristics that may 
easily be generalized to other regions that experience drug-terrorism interactions.  A short 
overview of these Latin American insurgencies may help lend a better understanding of 
the subject. 
 Latin American political insurgency movements began as early as the 1700s, and 
were primarily struggles for liberation from Spanish and Portuguese imperialism.  Even 




movement lent itself to the development of further movements.  For instance, Simon 
Bolivar, one of the greatest heroes of Latin America, guided many insurrectionist 
movements that ultimately brought independence to Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia.  
Other insurgent movements continued the fight for freedom throughout the nineteenth 
century, by the end of the Spanish-American War, Latin America freed itself from 
Iberian colonial control.  During that the era followed, independence wars and insurgent 
movement shifted their focus toward revolutionary resistance based on social and 
political demands.  Frequently insurgent movement would arise in opposition to 
established governments, the groups that initiated them not bothering to consider 
legitimate opposition methods.  In other cases, insurgent movements would oppose 
foreign interests that were perceived as harmful.  Until the Bolshevik revolution only a 
few insurgent groups were labeled terrorist due to fact that both leftist and rightist groups 
employed insurgent and guerilla tactics.  (Hoehn & Weiss, 1985).   
Taken as a whole, Latin American acceptance of thoughts and ideologies has 
occurred somewhat sporadically.  This acceptance, or lack thereof, has had an important 
impact on the ideological orientation of political and intellectual leaders. The Latin 
American states have digested, imitated, or accepted European ideologies unevenly and 
selectively. Distinct differences among those countries, including differences in their 
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and socio-economic makeup, help explain this lack of 
consistency.  Nevertheless, it is important to remember that Latin American countries are 





Some Latin American countries are ethnically, culturally, and racially 
homogeneous, consisting of a predominantly European population and strong cultural 
and political ties with Western Europe or the United States.  Countries of this type 
include Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Argentina. These countries, in turn, may have a strong 
impact on West European and even American ideological and cultural developments. 
Furthermore the Uruguayan Tupamaros or Argentine Montoneros were chosen as models 
by West European or American imitators.  Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and 
Paraguay, are all countries that have experienced a more ethnically, racially, and 
culturally mixed society.  They were among the last to be influenced by Western thought 
and developments.  Often times it is only the elite in these countries, who become 
“Westernized.”  Most Latin American countries fall somewhere between these two 
extremes, becoming somewhat Westernized while maintaining some of their own unique 
attributes (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).  
Following the Bolshevik revolution, Latin American insurgents began identifying 
themselves with Marxist-Leninist concepts of class and social structure.  Now identified 
as communistic in nature, a great deal of Latin American insurgent activity attracted 
international attention.  Up to this point, insurgent activities were often regarded as the 
isolated activities of dissatisfied partisans and local governmental forces. The impact of 
this type of insurgency on international political relations was marginal at best.  Today, 
however, insurgent groups often benefit from extensive and complex international 
connections. This increased resource base has helped them to evolve.  They have evolved 




international connections.  Moreover, these new insurgent groups have assumed an 
ideological character that has an impact on all levels of international affairs (Hoehn & 
Weiss, 1985). 
  Most of the Marxist insurgent movement is inspired by the “foco theory” of Che 
Guevara, the most famous hero of the Cuban revolution.  Guevara urged people of 
diverse political connections to arm themselves against repressive regimes.  Foco Theory 
maintains that in any country where class contradictions are intolerable, it is possible for 
a small nucleus of well-armed individuals to begin a guerilla campaign.  This campaign 
would serve as vehicle to mobilize the population at large into action, collapsing the 
existing system.   
In Colombia, the country where two of the insurgent groups presented in this 
study emerged, the first foco-derived movement was the Worker-Student-Peasant 
Movement (MOEC).  MOEC members were veterans of a unique Colombian genocidal 
cycle known as “la violence” (the violence).  They were recruited by Antonio Larotta in 
1960.  Following the death of Larotta in 1961 the MOEC was disbanded, and three new 
guerilla movements were born in the rural area of the Colombia: the EPL (Popular 
Liberation Army), ELN (National Liberation Army) and the FARC (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia).  In 1968, due to the enormous amount of violence that took 
place due to wars with these groups, the Colombian Army was increased threefold.  
Despite this increase in manpower, the guerilla forces thrived. 
After six years of fighting, the situation in Colombia became more complicated 




Bateman Canon.  During the 1980s amnesty talks between the government and guerillas 
could not bring about stable peace.  In 1985, the M-19 carried out the infamous Palace of 
Justice operation, leaving more than a hundred dead behind. 
Thoumi (1992) argues that the Colombian guerrilla movement was initiated due 
to justifiable frustration with the Colombian government throughout the twentieth 
century.  In 1953, a military government was founded with overwhelming popular 
support to end the La Violencia period.  Two political parties, in fear of losing their 
power to the military and weakened by a loss of traditional rural support, established this 
government, calling it the “National Front.”  This power-sharing agreement between the 
two political parties was to last for the next sixteen years.  It successfully eliminated the 
violence between Liberals and Conservatives.  However, it totally excluded all other 
Colombians who supported differing political views. 
 As part of the National Front agreement, the heads of the two participating parties 
agreed to divide most government jobs equally between them, going so far as to even  
alternate the presidency.  This application created a sort of “political cartel,” which not 
only held a monopoly on political power in Colombia, but, simultaneously precluded any 
new political groups, either from the extreme Right or Left, from taking part in 
Colombian politics.  As a result of their inability to legitimately participate in Colombian 
politics, these extremist groups organized into guerrilla movements and took over many 
of the state roles in places where governmental power was tenuous. 
 In addition to being exclusionary, the Colombian government also took on a 




appointments and services for votes.  The government developed various new functions 
and offices as the Colombian economy grew more complex.  However, often the criteria 
for appointing people to these new offices had little to do with merit.  As a result, the 
efficiency of the Colombian government dramatically decreased despite the fact that the 
number of sworn offices dramatically increased.  Consequently, the people of Colombia 
steadily lost their regard for the law.   
As government officials became more inefficient, they became less responsible, 
and less responsive to the citizens.  In both the private and public sectors, corruption 
progressively increased.  In addition, an extensive underground economy developed and 
thrived.  Perhaps most importantly, large areas of the country fell out of governmental 
control.   The growing difference between written law and socially accepted behavior 
resulted in a near complete delegitimation of the Colombian government.   
The loss of legitimation and weakening of the state formed grounds that insurgent 
guerrilla groups found sufficiently justifiable for initializing their own political and 
economic pans and policies.  The FARC and the M-19 provided alternative solutions for 
overcoming economical and political obstacles, and these policies received widespread 
support from struggling parts of the community (Thoumi, 1992). 
Today, Colombian guerillas remain active.  However they have moved away from 
their original spirit that sparked their participation in the revolutionary movement.  
FARC, the ENL, and EPL are still unable to gain enough of a legitimate following to be 
able to compete in mainstream politics.  Chances are slim that they will ever participate 




In order for three guerilla movements to survive in Colombia, they have allied 
themselves with drug traffickers.  The ELN is estimated to make $12.5 million through 
protection of the drug traffickers and kidnapping ransoms.  The FARC is still the largest 
group with seven thousand members. However, little of the original revolutionary 
idealism remains among the guerillas.  
In another Latin American country, Peru, the guerillas aim accomplish their 
objectives by aligning their movement with the aspirations of the indigenous peasants, 
helping them recover their land and dignity in exchange for manpower support. The 
Sendero Luminoso (The Shinning Path), commonly known as the Communist party of 
Peru, is the major insurgent group in Peru.  It first gained the attention of the Peruvians 
on May 17, 1980, when it declared war against the Peruvian Government. At the 
beginning Sendero Luminoso seemed as if it were close to accomplish its goals of taking 
over the government and creating a new democracy for Peru.  However, the Sendero has 
traditionally been associated with unparalleled violence and its complex ideology 
requires close examination (Castro, 1999). 
Narco-terrorism Cases in Colombia 
 Violence in Colombia is almost “traditional.”  Its history, political life, and 
consequent insurgence movements contain numerous outrageously violent events.  
Terrorism consists of using violence to deter those who support an unwanted agenda, and 
Colombian political insurgent groups had no difficulties adopting these violent tactics. 
“Colombia is a country of contradictions,” states Camilo A. Azcarate (1999).  He 




are also individualistic, rugged and intense.  Violence in Colombia is an age-old pattern 
of interaction between social actors. It can be traced back to the nineteen century.  
Colombian history also includes periods of political cleansing such as the period between 
1948-1959 in which violent political confrontations left 300,000 civilians dead and 
created countless widows and orphans.  Another point of view indicates that the “La 
Violencia” era of Colombia began in 1930 when conservatives lost the presidential 
election because they ran two candidates.  This intra-party competition split party voters 
and gave liberals the presidency by default.  La Violencia is usually dated from 1948 to 
1960, but Schmidt (1974) argues that it should begin with this election, running then from 
1930 to 1964.  Between these years 480,600 people were killed due to domestic violence. 
Table 3: Colombian Domestic Violence 
Years Casualties 
1830 -1854 10,600 
1860 -1895 20,000 
1899 – 1902 150,000 
1948 -1965 300,000 
Total 480,600 
Source: La Violencia Revisited: The Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia 
 
In spite of their various origins, Colombia’s guerilla groups have all drawn upon 
the legacy of “La Violencia.”  In fact, many insurgent leaders have acknowledged in 
interviews that they were influenced by the assassination of populist leader Jorge Eliecer 
Gaitan in 1948.  The areas where the guerillas are predominantly active today are the 




movements geographically coincide with Revolutionary Liberal Movement and activities 
of the communist enclaves.  
Despite the continuous declaration of peace and solidarity among the political 
parties, violent uprisings have continued to plague Colombia.  This continuation is due in 
large part to the perception of social inequity and political obstruction among the lower 
classes.  Essentially, this violence continues to persist due to repeated and generally 
frustrated attempts by the marginalized sectors of society to gather a better share of 
Colombian affluence.  The inability of these social sects to be able to participate 
legitimately in the legal political arena has led the Colombian underclass to turn to 
alternative methods, namely violence in the form of revolutionary insurrection and 
guerilla movements (Boudon, 1996).    
 Besides its undertone of violence, Colombia has another hazardous characteristic, 
one capable of creating even bigger conflicts when taken together with political violence.  
Namely, Colombia has become an epicenter for drug production and, subsequently, drug 
trafficking.  The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of the U.S. State 
Department (2000) identify Colombia as the biggest producer and distributor of cocaine,  
its production exceeding that every other country that is involved in the illegal drug trade.  
In addition, the country is also an important supplier of heroin. The already turbulent 
Colombian situation has now become even more convoluted due to massive influx of 
cash generated by the illegal drug business that has fed the violent insurgents.  Almost 
half of Colombia’s national territory is controlled by the illegal guerrilla and paramilitary 




presence has traditionally been weak.  These groups tax traffickers in return for the 
protection of their drug cultivating farms and narcotics laboratories.  The strengthening of 
ties between drug producers and guerrilla forces and their collective attacks on the 
Colombian government have hindered counter-narcotics operations, especially in the 
guerrilla-controlled south, but also in the paramilitary-dominated areas in the north. 
Colombia produces about eighty percent of world’s cocaine.  The DEA reports 
that Colombia is also origin of the sixty percent of all heroin seized in the United States.  
Most of the cocaine produced in the Andean Region is produced by Colombia.  (Table 4 
shows a detailed breakdown of illegal crop production in Colombia.)  Despite record-
high reports of the eradication of illicit crops, illegal drugs production has increased by 
thirty percent due to the fact that opium fields and coca plantations have doubled in size 
in the last three years.  Moreover, between 1994 and 1998, government corruption and 
the intensity of armed conflict increased dramatically.  Many politicians were bribed with 
drug money while drug traffickers assaulted those government agents who continued to 
investigate the illicit drug trade.  The Pastrana administration confirmed their renewed 
promise to end violence and the illegal drug trade.  Regardless of this commitment, the 
administration lost forty percent of its people to guerrillas.  The Colombian National 
Police and the army were not very successful in eradicating the illegal corps due to their 
inadequate funds (Bibes, 2001).   
Despite evidence that indicates the existence of a drug-insurgency interaction, 
Clawson and Reensselaer (1996) argue that drug traffickers and insurgents often have 






Table 4: Illicit Crop Production in Colombia 
 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
COCA       
Potential Harvest 
(ha) 
136,200 122,500 101,800 79,500 67,200 50,900 
Eradication (ha) 47,000 43,246 - 19,000 5,600 8,750 
Estimated 
Cultivation (ha) 
183,200 - - 98,500 72,800 59,650 
Estimated Cocaine 
Production(mt) 
580 520 435 350 300 230 
OPIUM       
Potential Harvest 
(ha) 
- 7,500 6,100 6,600 6,300 6,540 
Eradication (ha) 9,254 - - 6,972 6,028 3,760 
Estimated 
Cultivation (ha) 
- - - 13,572 12,328 10,300 
CANNABIS(*)       
Potential Harvest 
(ha) 
5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 4,980 4,986 
Eradication (ha) - - - - - 20 
Estimated 
Cultivation (ha 
5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Potential Yield(mt) 4,150 4,150 4,150 4,150 4,150 4,133 
Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000.  
(*)Reported cannabis cultivation has not been confirmed by USG survey. 
mid 1980s.  The concerns of wealthy narcotraffickers about the security of their private 
property have allied them with Colombian elite against leftist guerrillas.  For example 
Pablo Escobar, a well known drug trafficker, characterized himself a “man of 
investments.”  He strictly denied being a member of the guerrillas because of the guerrilla 
ideology advocates the relinquishment of private property.  The decision of the Medellin 
Cartel to invest much of its cocaine revenues in farms, ranches, and land in moderately 
unprotected vicinities of Colombia became an important catalyst that incited guerrilla-




vulnerable, or their neighbors had been, to extortion by the FARC and other guerrilla 
groups.  
Clawson and Reensselaer (1996) cite the Colombian Paramilitary of the 1980s as 
another example of conflict between traffickers and guerillas.  Armed self-defense 
organizations were active in Colombia for a while to protect property owners against 
guerrilla practices, such as extortion and kidnapping.  However, the lack of equipment 
and training in these self-defense groups eventually led landowners to pay taxes to 
guerrillas (Guerrilla taxes on the Colombian Cocaine and Heroin Industry for 1994 and 
1995 are shown in the Table 5).  This situation changed as Colombian Cocaine barons 
invested some of their profits in vast tracts of land in Cordoba, Antioquia, Meta, and 
other Colombia departments.   
Table 5: Guerrilla Taxes on Colombian Cocaine and Heroin Industry 1994-1995 
Activity Tax Amount 
Cultivation 10,000 pesos per hectare per month 
Processing  5,000 pesos per kilo produced  
Export from trafficking zone 20,000 to 30,000 per kilo shipped 
Operation of Laboratory Up to 12 million pesos per month 
Use of airstrip 10 million pesos per month 
Import chemicals into zone  1,000 pesos per liter 
Import gasoline into zone  1,000 per 55-gallon drum 
Source: Andean Cocaine Industry. 
Consider this example of typical progression.  In the Middle Magdalena Valley of 
Puerto Boyoca, drug trafficking purchases raised the price of a hectare of land from 
$100,000 in the early 1980s to $1 million in 1989.  Many of the recently purchased tracts 




Whether their land intended to be used for drug cultivation or legitimate farming, the 
newly landed narcotraffickers found themselves face to face with guerrillas.  The need to 
combat these guerrillas led the drug lords to fund the revitalization and renovation of the 
local-self defense forces, or even create forces where they did not exist before.  Drug 
barons assumed the leadership of, and most of the financial responsibility for, these 
defense forces to combat the guerillas. This narco-backed self-defense movement has 
been instrumental in extricating Communist guerrillas from certain regions of Colombia.  
According to one Colombian official, where the paramilitary who were backed by money 
from drug trafficking existed, there were no guerrillas. The well-trained, well-paid, 
blood-thirsty paramilitary groups were respected by guerrillas (Clawson & Rensselaer, 
1996). 
In his war-system theory, Richani (1997) presents another approach to the matter, 
an approach similar to one of Clawson and Rensselaer.  He maintains that the constant 
violent conflict in Colombia between the guerilla and the armed forces has allowed the 
drug traffickers to thrive. The drug traffickers benefited from the military balance 
between the guerrilla and the military, which permitted quasi-autonomous territories to be 
established. Consequently, the traffickers moved into the role of “balancer” between the 
two opposing forces, contributing some of their own resources to keep either side from 
victory so that they themselves could maintain their autonomy. 
The traffickers negotiated alliances, however temporary, with both sides and used 
corruption to establish relationships with military officers, guerrillas, and politicians.  




their alliance became conflicted by their incompatible manifestos. Also the acts of 
imposing taxes and protecting peasants by the insurgents make conflict with the 
traffickers inevitable.  The drug traffickers in some areas have even bought large tracts of 
land and then sought to force out the peasants.  The illicit drug smugglers, then reacted to 
their situation by creating paramilitary groups of their own, calling upon their legally 
protected right to establish such groups for self-defense.  
In essence, the model proposed by Richani emphasizes how ideology and the 
struggle for resources keep Colombia in a state of perpetual turmoil.  The traffickers and 
the corrupted officers of conservative military share a need to protect their monetary 
resources and capitalistic ideology.  However, the insurgents and the paramilitary forces 
share the desire to prevent the establishment of a strongly legalistic Westernized state.  
The constant ebb and flow between these groups has produced a dynamic that allows 
violence in Colombia not only to perpetuate itself but to flourish and expand. The war 
system permits the open flow of inputs and outputs through social surroundings, but of 
course with porous boundaries (Richani, 1997). 
According to Ehrenfeld (1990) the narcotics industry could not have grown as it 
has without one critical factor: the drug traffickers’ alliance with the guerrillas of 
Colombia.  That alliance is the basis for narco-terrorism. Without it, narco-terrorism 
would probably not exist in this hemisphere, at the very least it extremely would be 
limited in scope. The narco-guerrilla alliance has two fundamental characteristics. First, 
the economic incentive: Colombia’s guerrilla armies have learned through long 




their revolution.  Second, the ideological incentive: there are now direct working links 
forged between the terrorist-guerrilla groups and the narco-traffickers to carry out acts of 
terrorism. Their motives may be different, but their common goal is to destabilize and 
undermine the government. The evidence indicating an alliance between these groups is 
often scattered and exaggerated.  However, clearly visible evidence indicates that their 
cooperative efforts are deadly and devastating.  In the early 1980s, the FARC and the M-
19 made agreements with at least several prominent narcotics traffickers. The deal was 
simple, straightforward, and mutually profitable. In exchange for guerrilla protection, the 
cartel would allocate a percentage of its drug profits to be spent on arms for the 
insurgents. Thus, while the drug lords had their gunmen enabling them to carry out their 
business, the guerrillas used the monies paid by the cartel to escalate their war. 
A closer look at some of the insurgent groups that have been involved or allegedly 
involved with the illegal drug trade will afford a better understanding of narco-terrorism. 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC 
The FARC is an insurgent/terrorist group that has plagued Colombian political 
and social structures for over thirty years.  Its militaristic structure, ideology, and 
conceptualization of violence distinguish it from other guerrilla groups. 
The FARC is active in the Colombian Departments of Tolima, Caqueta, Huila, 
Cauca, Antioquia, Santander, and Boyoca.  It was founded as the armed part of the 
Colombian Communist Party and in May of 1966 when a number of Marulanda Velez’s 




the Colombian Communist Party agenda has dictated the general policy and leadership 
mechanism of the FARC.   
The leadership of the FARC is associated with Pedro Antonio Marin, a man who 
changed his name to Marulanda Velez in tribute to a trade unionist who was killed during 
protests against Colombian troops’ deployment to the Korean War.  Velez’s chief 
assistant was Jacobo Arenas.  Jaime Guaraca, Alfanso Cano, and Raul Reyes also hold 
key leadership positions in the FARC organization.  Velez was born into a peasant family 
and had barely any education.  He is known as one of Latin America’s veteran guerrillas 
due to his more than thirty-tear guerrilla experience.  Through the course of these years, 
he was pronounced dead several times in conflicts with the army.  Nevertheless, he kept 
re-emerging in guerrilla action.  He is a member of the Central Committee of the 
Colombian Communist Party and he announced his intention of entering political arena 
by joining the parliament in 1984.  He is considered by many to be an expert at survival, 
a brilliant tactician, and a strong-minded commander.  He uses moving language and a 
charismatic demeanor to garner support, touting ideas of justice and freedom.  He was 
personally active in combat and proved a good marksman.  For nearly twenty years he 
exercised control over the FARC and abolished all potential opponents. 
Ideologically, the FARC backs the Colombian Communist Party’s thirteenth 
Congress tenets that call for a commitment to the creation of a “broad anti-monopoly and 
anti-imperialist front.”  It sees the nationalization of foreign enterprises, primarily 
financial institutions, as an obligation and shares the main economic objectives of the 




and all the leftist insurgent movements in Latin America.  The FARC’s propaganda 
targets the radicalization of the Colombian peasants.  It calls for revolutionary warfare 
and supports the Colombian Communist Party’s ideological positions.  The FARC’s 
violence against peasants who refuse to cooperate is unparalleled.  The FARC units have 
systematically killed peasants for helping government forces.  Unlike many grass roots 
militants, the FARC leadership has a clear picture of the basic objectives of the guerrilla 
fight.  It aims to maintain political and social turbulence in order to create a base for a 
communist-led national anti-governmental action. 
International sympathizers have assisted the FARC with their military training.  
FARC guerrillas are trained primarily in Colombia, but intelligence services have 
observed at least thirty FARC guerrillas in specialized tactical and weapons camps in 
both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.  After collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Cuba took 
over as the primary base for the FARC members.  FARC recruits generally come from 
the Trade Union Confederation, which is to a greater extent, under the influence of the 
Colombian Communist Party.  The FARC has generally focused on rural guerrilla 
strategies, but it also deploys urban tactical operations (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).  
Furthermore, from early 1998 to the end of 1999, the FARC has extended its field of 
operations and the size and scope of those operations, extending military confrontations 
to several major cities, like Medellin, and over the outskirts of the capital, Bogotá (Petras, 
2000). 
The Military structure of the FARC is openly presented on the FARC’s own web 




Army of the People] [is] the people's army and [has] consolidated as a military-political 
organization, which is made up of sixty fronts that are present on all [parts of] national 
territory. It also has urban structures in the cities, which are organized into seven blocks 
of fronts.”  They state that all activity of the FARC-EP is regulated by three codified 
policies: The statute, the Regulations o f the Disciplinary Regime, or the Internals Rules 
of Command.  First, the FARC-EP follows the Statute: The Statute is the ideological 
foundation of the FARC-EP.  The statute outlines the FARC-EP’s organizational 
structure, its chain of command, the obligations and rights of the combatants by rank, and 
the basic principles of the revolutionary organization.  See Table 6 for a comparison of 
some FARC-EP ranks with those of a traditional army.   
Table 6: Comparison of the ranks in the FARC with those of traditional armies.  
TRADITIONAL ARMY FARC-EP 
Sub official Candidate for Commander 
Corporal second class Squad Deputy 
Corporal first class Squad Commander 
Sergeant second class Guerilla Deputy 
Sergeant first class Guerilla Commander 
Sergeant Major Company Deputy 
Sub lieutenant Company Commander 
Lieutenant Column Deputy 
Captain Column Commander 
Major Front Deputy 
Lieutenant Colonel Front Commander 
Colonel Block Deputy 
Brigadier General Block Commander 





 Secondly, the FARC-EP proscribes to the Regulations of the Disciplinary 
Regime.  The Regulations of the Disciplinary Regime codify essential matters of military 
order.  Here FARC-EP soldiers and potential soldiers read of the types of behaviors that 
expected and appropriate. 
 Finally, The Internal Rules of Command outlines the ordinary duties of each of 
the different units of the FARC-EP.  Like that of most modern armies, the FARC-EP unit 
structure is complex and hierarchical.  The units of the FARC-EP are laid out in Table 7. 
Table 7: The FARC-EP Units 
1  Squad The basic unit consisting of 12 combatants 
2 Guerilla Consists of two squads 
3 Company Consists of two guerrillas 
4 Column Consists of two or more companies. 
5 Front: Consists of more than one column. 
6 The Central High 
Command 
Designates the highest command of each front. 
7 Block of Fronts Consists of five or more fronts. It co-ordinates and unifies 
the activity of the fronts in a specific zone of the country. 
8 The Central High 
Command or its 
secretariat 
Designates the High Command of each Block. They 
coordinate the areas of the respective blocks. 
9 Central High Command  The superior organism of direction and command of the 
FARC-EP. Its agreements, orders and decisions rule over 





The degree to which the FARC is involved with the illicit drug trade is a 
controversial issue.  Some sources claim that the FARC has been active in every phases 
of the illicit drug business.  Others argue that such accusations are the black propaganda 
of a U.S. backed Colombian government.  Radu and Tismaneanu (1990) openly argue 
that the FARC has been associated with other drug trafficking guerrilla organizations in 
drug traffic operations when they explain Logistic and Equipment issues of the FARC.  
Other researchers provide different numbers that indicate that the FARC has generated 
income from due drug trade, taxation, extortion and kidnapping.  The only contention 
between these authors is over how much income the FARC has generated.  It is perhaps 
impossible, however, to correctly estimate the income of the FARC due to the secretive 
nature of the business.       
A particular case in 1984 brought the guerrilla-narco-trafficker interaction to 
attention of officials.  In this particular case Colombian Police conducted a sting 
operation on a large cocaine production center that housed seventeen laboratories in Yuri, 
a place in the eastern lowlands of Tranquilanda.  The police met heavy resistance, but 
government forces took control and seized 12,500 kilograms of cocaine worth of $1.2 
billion.  In the buildings there were documents that linked the case to the Medellin Cartel 
with no doubt.  Documents also showed that this cocaine production complex had forty to 
sixty personnel and they were protected by FARC guerrillas. The connection between 





DEA Administrator Donnie R. Marshall (2000), testified before The House 
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime on December 13, 2000.  In his statement, 
he asserted that there may be other links between drug traffickers and the terrorists 
associations beyond the deep-rooted presence of the FARC in the drug cultivation and 
processing areas.  DEA reports and analysis showed several instances of this type of 
collaboration.  Some insurgent units raised funds through extortion or by protecting 
laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, 
the insurgents protected cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. Some FARC and 
ELN units, according to Marshall’s report, were probably independently involved in 
limited cocaine laboratory operations. Some insurgent units apparently also assisted drug 
trafficking groups by transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia. In 
particular, some insurgent units protected clandestine airstrips in southern Colombia.  
Michael A. Sheehan (2000), the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. 
Department of State, also testified before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee 
on Crime on December 13, 2000.  He stated that “Colombia is the strongest example of 
what is meant by the phrase "narco terrorism," and [is a country] where the drug trade is a 
major factor.  A cycle of terrorism and narco-trafficking has spiraled into a mutually 
dependent relationship.”  The terrorists and paramilitaries provide protection for drug 
traffickers who have, in turn become a financial source for them.  The FARC, considered 
one of the world's deadliest terrorist organizations, has recently made moves to gain full 
control of the cocaine base across Colombia.  There is evidence that indicates the 




Mexican and Colombian officials have discovered a main connection between the 
Mexican drug cartel and the FARC. Facts show the FARC provided cocaine to the cartel 
in exchange for money and probably weapons. 
Colombia offers a strong example of the revolutionary and paramilitary forces 
that depend on drug trafficking for their ability to wage war. The success of the FARC is 
captivating.  It has thrived in spite of the fact that its former sponsor, the sponsor of many 
Marxist revolutionary groups in the developing world, namely Soviet Union, has 
collapsed. Against all odds, the FARC’s power has remained strong. It is currently active 
and controls almost forty percent of the country.  This supremacy is tremendously 
sustained by cocaine and opium sales within areas controlled by the FARC.  Colombia 
produces eighty percent of the world's cocaine and a growing proportion of the world's 
heroin.  A majority of these drugs are grown and processed in rebel-controlled land, and 
most of that land is controlled by the FARC.  The power of the FARC has increased since 
the end of the Cold War, and it now has the Colombian military on the defensive across 
much of the countryside. Despite enormous investments in drug interdictions by the U.S. 
government, the FARC expanded its territory and increased the number of its fighters.  
As long as their plans are supported by extremely profitable illicit actions, it seems that 
no governmental power will be able to control or stop the FARC.  They, and other 
revolutionary groups like them, can prosper in an age of global pressure and isolation. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the FARC earns nearly half a billion dollar a year 
from drug profits and related kidnapping ransoms.  A revolutionary group can maintain a 




generated by Colombia's cocaine and opium trade. The FARC no longer must relay on 
the whim of the Soviets to support their political and military agendas.   The enormous 
profits earned through the production and export of cocaine and opium prove to be much 
more lucrative (Steinberg, 2000). 
In late 1980s, the FARC is one of the guerrilla groups that has refuse to 
demobilize and has found independent financing allowing it to remain in the field and 
even grow stronger over time.  In following years, the FARC developed a strong presence 
in coca-growing areas, where it charged fees to plantations for ‘protection.’  Following a 
disease that shattered almost thirty percent of the coca fields in Peru's upper Huallaga 
Valley in the mid-1990s, drug traffickers moved to Colombia's jungles and started 
experimenting with the plants, producing a heartier coca plant hybrid with a higher 
cocaine yield. Accordingly, Colombians boosted the amount of land being used to grow 
coca from 20,000 hectares to 120,000 hectares within five years. The FARC took 
advantage of the situation and became probably the wealthiest insurgent group in history 
by controlling the crops and increasing its income to more than $600 million a year.  The 
FARC gained a legitimate social power base due to its control over the coca plantations. 
This fact became noticeable when coca growers held mass protests against the eradication 
efforts of the government.   These growers were middle-class entrepreneurs from all part 
of the country.  More than 100,000 growers backed by the FARC, protested for several 
weeks. The government had to agree to limit its fumigation program to coca plantations 




In terms of its objectives, it is not clear whether the FARC wants to take part in 
formulating policies or if the group is content to sustain absolute control over the region 
they have taken. It is clear that both the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army) 
are well financed. These two guerrilla groups have a collective income of about $900 
million a year. Around $500 million of this revenue is earned through taxes on coca 
producers.  The remainder is earned through kidnapping and extortion.  Even though it 
would not be entirely correct to liken these insurgent groups to ‘ordinary’ organized 
crime ring or drug traffickers, there are strong resemblance between the FARC and the 
these types of criminals (Shifter, 1999). 
Suarez (2000) also provides some numbers concerning the income of Colombian 
Guerrillas. According to his writings, the estimated income of the Colombian guerrillas 
may be as high as $600 million a year or over $1.5 million a day.  FARC gets $360 
million out of this sum.  This is revenue bigger than the Banco de Colombia, one of the 
biggest banks of Colombia.  It is twice the size of El Tiempo, Colombia’s biggest 
newspaper and over half the income of Bavaria, a well-known financial group.  It exceeds 
by $35 million dollars the sales of Celumovil, one of Colombia's largest cellular phone 
companies.  Suarez estimates that forty-eight percent of the FARC's revenues come from 
its involvement in drug trafficking, thirty six percent from extortion, eight percent from 
kidnapping, six percent from cattle theft, and the remainder from robbery of financial 
institutions and other sources.   
The FARC’s taxation system touches each and every phase of the business, from 




zones to the interior, where it is exported to foreign markets for consumption.  The arrival 
of chemicals used to convert coca into cocaine is controlled through checkpoints on land 
and water. There are set taxes per ton or gallon of the supplies most broadly used in the 
refinement process.  The number of guerrilla-controlled checkpoints determines the rate 
of taxation for the materials that must pass through on the way to the labs. FARC charges 
growers who cultivate plots smaller than four hectares on a sliding scale, exacting fees 
that are in proportion to the size of their crops.  The weight of the product determines the 
tax that is paid by refineries. Cocaine, the final product, requires higher taxes than 
products on process. “Gramaje, or grammage” is the name of this particular tax and it is 
ten percent of the selling price per gram.  Land, water or air transportation of the drugs 
from the control areas is also taxed. The maintenance of laboratories and landing strips, 
and precursors needed for the conversion that are carried by air are also subject to 
taxation. Each aircraft pays its fee as it enters or leaves the area.  It is estimated that 
eighty percent of all cocaine production in the country is taxed by the FARC, and this 
forms the primary source of income of the guerrilla group.  The FARC also boosts its 
income by growing its own coca, using no middlemen, monopolizing coca leaf 
purchases, constructing landing strips on their own property, and by constructing their 
own coca paste refineries.  In other words, in recent years, the extent of the group's 
involvement in actions associated with drugs has been dramatically amplified (Suarez, 
2000). 
Despite the evidence, the FARC and other guerrilla groups deny financing their 




FARC, describe the narco-guerrilla thesis as an international campaign created by the 
CIA against the revolutionary movement, against democracy, and against the social 
progress of people.  FARC leader Manuel Marulanda also claimed that guerrilla and 
narcotic traffic had nothing to do with one another, they were something very different 
(Lee, 1989). 
The latest interview with Marulanda’s first assistant Raul Reyes shows some 
difference from those 1989 statements.  The following excerpt from this interview 
provides valuable insight into the current position of the FARC on key issue.   
Marin asks: “And what about drugs? Isn’t a major source of the FARC’s finance 
from coca and poppy production?” 
Reyes: “In Colombia, production undeniably exists, but actual local drug 
consumption is relatively small. Nor does Colombia produce the chemicals required for 
extraction and purification of the drugs. What Colombia does, because of the collapse of 
the rural economy, is to grow poppies and coca. The FARC is in all Colombia, from the 
Amazon to the borders with Venezuela and the Orinoco River, and to the borders of 
Ecuador and the Putumayo. Our being in a particular area does not mean we are engaged 
in growing the crops.  On the other hand, the FARC represents a people in arms and has 
to survive from whatever [it] produces that goes into the overall economy of the country. 
The FARC is a revolutionary organization that is not in the business of tackling the 
cultivation of drugs or of fighting the traffickers. That is the responsibility of the state, 




Marin: “You mean to tell me that the relationship between FARC and drug 
trafficking is limited to occupying territory which happens to have illicit crops?” 
Reyes: Exactly. “The FARC is present throughout the country and it needs 
resources to strengthen its political hold. Therefore it imposes taxes on whatever is 
grown, whether coca or cattle, soya or sorghum. If, tomorrow, coca was no longer grown, 
then the FARC would seek taxes on whatever was substituted.” (Marin, 2001).    
Petras (2000) also denies the FARC’s interaction with drug trafficking and 
traffickers.   He believes that the FARC’s present position is to end its offensive by 
negotiating with the Colombian authorities for a peaceful resolution. The FARC has also 
presented some primary socio-economic reforms that oppose the neoliberal agenda of the 
current Colombian government and the United States.  This agenda opposes that of the 
Central American guerrillas.  These reforms take a righteous position against the drug-
corrupted capitalist politicians and military officials. The FARC guards peasants that 
grow coca and employs taxation on the dealers who buy the leaf in FARC-controlled 
areas.  Furthermore the FARC neither produces nor sells coca or drugs.  As clearly 
declared by the FARC both movements distinguish between coca-growing peasants and 
drug traffickers. Today associations between the cocaine lords and the ruling class are 
recognized by the majority of the people. This controlling group funds its political 
activities with drug money and abuses their impunity while controlling the government. 
The April 19th Movement- M 19 
Movimiento 19 de Abril, or the April 19th Movement is another Colombian 




The group believes that foul play of the opposing forces led to the ousting of its favored 
leader, Rojas Panilla.  The M-19 first appeared in 1974, when it claimed to be the armed 
hand of the ANAPO (National Popular Alliance), despite the disavowal of ANAPO 
leaders.  It has nearly 5000 members and operates mainly in Southern and Southwestern 
Colombia.  
Jaime Bateman Cajon was the founder of the M-19 movement.  He was a lawyer 
before he became a professional guerrilla leader.  He was killed in an alleged airplane 
crash in the northeast part of the country in 1983.  Intelligence sources indicate that Cajon 
was originally a member of the FARC but was disappointed with the FARC’s failure 
within the political arena.  He therefore founded his own guerrilla movement.  He was a 
charismatic leader, however tented toward violent anarchic action.   
Ivan Marino Ospina was another important person who served as leader of the 
front operating in Caqueta.  He joined the M-19 in 1971 and was trained in Cuba and 
Eastern Europe.  He was arrested in March, 1981 and stayed in prison until he was 
granted amnesty in 1982.  Following his release he went back to Cuba and eventually 
returned as a front leader for M-19. He was killed on August 28, 1985 in fire-fight. Other 
top leaders of the M-19 include Alvaro Fayad, Carlos Pizarro, Antonio Navarro, and 
Gustava Arias.   
In terms of ideology, the M-19’s philosophy unites Rojas Pinilla’s quasi-fascist 
populism with a peculiar socialist, or Marxist, viewpoint.  Social justice, equality, and 
economic democracy were its primary goals early on.  M-19 leaders were influenced 




M-19 is one of the most decidedly Marxist revolutionary group in Colombia, though it 
claims to be a patriotic, leftist movement.  The M-19 was successful in attaining its own 
impressive financial base through terrorist tactics.  It initially used kidnappings and 
robberies to gain most of its money.  However, today the cocaine trade is the main source 
of its revenue (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990). 
The interaction between the M-19 and drug traffickers has been observed in two 
important cases:  The Guillot-Lara episode and bloody Palace of Justice massacre.  The 
Guillot-Lara was an international event in the 1980s that uncovered the many dimensions 
of narco-terrorism.  The episode revealed the strong ties between drug and gun 
traffickers, the M-19 guerrillas, and the sovereign government of Cuba. 
The leader of the M-19, Jaime Bateman, used Jaime Guillot-Lara, a close friend 
of him, as his main arms provider.  Lara acted as a link between the M-19 and the 
Cubans.  Guillot Lara’s job was quite simple during the mid-1970s.  He would travel 
from Colombia to Florida, buy guns, and bring them back to Colombia by boat.  
However, the United States, due to the growing volume of drug trade via the same route, 
took action to close these easy trafficking routes.   
By the end of the 1970s, Cubans began to realize the sheer enormity of the market 
for cocaine trade in the US.  An initial meeting to discuss the strategy for taking 
advantage of this market took place in Bogotá between Guillot-Lara, Fernandc Ravelo 
Renedo, the Cuban ambassador plenipotentiary to Colombia, and Gonsalo Bassols 
Suarez, the Cuban minister counselor to Colombia in 1979.  Juan Lazaro ‘Johnny’ 




embassy, which was attended by representatives from the Cuban Central Intelligence 
Directorate in August of same year.  In this meeting, the Cubans conditionally agreed to 
serve as an intermediary transfer point for drugs on their way to the United States from 
Colombia.  Colombians traffickers would pay the Cubans for each shipment that passed 
through their territorial waters, and than would buy guns for guerrillas from the Cuban 
government.  This deal afforded the narco-terrorists a safe haven within striking distance 
of the American shore while providing the Cubans with a steady source of much needed 
foreign exchange.   
During their interaction with the Colombians, the Cubans, besides obtaining 
revenue from drug trafficking, also served as an arm dealer for terrorist organizations.  
Due to orders from the M-19 national directorate, in January of 1981, Guillot went to 
Panama and met with Cuban First Secretary, Gonzalez Bassols Suarez, and Jaime 
Bateman. During the course of the meeting, Bateman stressed the significance of 
obtaining arms for the M19, and arranged for Guillot himself to receive a shipment 
delivered to Colombia’s Guajira Peninsula. On 15 October Guillot journeyed to Dibulla, 
a Colombian port where his boat, the Zar de Honduras, arrived loaded with arms. The 
arms were unloaded for distribution among the M-19.  In return, Guillot filled the boat 
with five thousand pounds of Colombian marijuana to be transported to Cuba, and then 
sold in the United States (Adams, 1986). 
In November of 1982 the U.S. government indicted four high-ranking members of 
the Cuban government for conspiracy to smuggle narcotics into the United States also 




Communist Party Central Committee, Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cusardo and Rene 
Rodriguez Cruz, and two members of Cuba’s diplomatic mission to Colombia, 
Ambassador FernandoRavelo Renedo and Minister-Counselor Gonzalo Bassols Suarez. 
Along with the Cuban officials, nine Cuban-Americans were indicted.  The indictments 
stated that the Cuban officials conspired with Guillot-Lara to use Cuba as an offloading 
station for drugs smuggled into the United States. Additionally, the Cuban Navy was to 
protect, re-supply and refuel Guillot-Lara’s ships and to provide him with a competitive 
advantage by seizing the ships and aircraft of his rivals. Guillot-Lara would provide the 
Cuban officials with $800,000 for every vessel they handled. In return, he also agreed to 
smuggle arms and supplies from Cuba to the M-19 guerillas back in Colombia (Miller 
and Damask, 1996). 
In 1983, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas O. 
Enders, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 
stated that Colombian drug traffickers and communist guerrillas had developed a string 
alliance.  Therefore, that alliance included officials of the Cuban government. Enders 
states: 
“Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using a Colombian narcotics ring 
to funnel arms as well as funds to Colombian M-19 guerrillas. This 
narcotics ring was led by Jaimie Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug trafficker 
now in custody in Mexico. He has admitted to working for Havana in 
purchasing arms for the M-19. We have information that Guillot traveled 
twice to Cuba since October 1981 and that on the second visit he received 






Enders continued by explaining how Guillot-Lara played a leading part in transferring 
arms via a Colombian plane that the M-19 had hijacked. Five armed M-19 member 
provided security at the airstrip. In return, Guillot-Lara also supplied the M-19 with cash 
(Ehrenfeld, 1990, p. 99). 
In November of 1985 the M-19 attacked the Palace of Justice, the Supreme Court 
of Colombia.  They killed eleven justices and destroyed the extradition files.  They were 
paid five million dollars and provided by weapons by drug traffickers (Lupsha, 1989).  
Lupsha called this operation “true narco-terrorism,” and specifically categorized it as 
“Insurgent Surrogate Narco-terrorism,” that is, narco-terrorism where insurgents act as 
the surrogates of traffickers. 
This invasion of the Palace of Justice took twenty-eight hours.  One-hundred 
people were killed including eleven Supreme Court Justices, thirty-nine other hostages, 
and seventeen soldiers.  The weapons that were used by the M-19 during the attack were 
recovered.  Investigative efforts determined their origin.  Some of the weapons were 
commercially available; others were strictly military weapons. Many of the military 
weapons were American-made M16s’ and were traced to various places.  Interestingly 
enough, the guns used by M-19 to wage the attack matched the kinds of weapons seized 
in raids on several drug cartel bases.  There were five Belgian 7.62mm FAL rifles and 
one Israeli 9mm Uzi submachine gun among the recovered guns.  State Department 
intelligence confirmed the purchase and delivery of a shipment of these types of guns 




Ehrenfeld (1990) evaluates the case and maintains that there were more important 
consequences of this attack than the death of eleven justices. As result of the destruction 
of thousands of records the prosecution of nearly two hundred key drug traffickers 
became totally impossible.  The M-19 had the kind of firepower and tactical skill that the 
Medellin Cartel did not have.  The M-19 terrorists also ruined the Colombian justice 
system.  No justice since has signed a single extradition order of notorious drug 
traffickers to the United States. 
The United States government was able to draw a direct connection between the 
drug traffickers and the Palace of Justice attack.  The U.S. authorities claimed that the 
attack was possibly financed by the Medellin Cartel because the M-19 primarily 
destroyed the extradition files of drug traffickers (Craig, 1987).  
There are various theories about the involvement of drug traffickers in the Palace 
of Justice massacre.  Some say it was directly financed by traffickers; others claim it was 
solely an M-19 operation.  However, aside from the United States claims that narco-
traffickers were involved in the attack, it is simply a logical conclusion that there is a 
connection between drug traffickers and the M-19 assault.  Without Financial incentives, 
the M-19 would never attempt this type of operation to rescue two hundred drug 
traffickers from extradition to the United States.  If these traffickers had been 
incarcerated, the M-19 would have lost a substantial source of income. 
Narco-terrorism Cases in Peru 
Peru is another Latin American Country that has both of the elements of narco-




quantities of illicit crops in its soil (Table 8 shows the detailed illegal coca production 
numbers of Peru).  Peru remains on the President’s list of major drug-producing countries 
(INCSR, 2000). 
In the Latin American cocaine industry Peruvians have supplied raw material in 
the form of coca leaves and coca paste to Colombians processing labs who then process 
and distribute the cocaine.  Peasant coca growers in Peru sell their coca paste to local 
gangs that are controlled by Colombian traffickers.  In the Huallaga Valley alone, seven 
or eight Colombian-controlled trafficker groups operate, primarily organizing flights that 
transfer the paste to drug cartel labs on the Colombian border.  It is estimated that 
between 60,000 and 300,000 peasant families grow coca in the Huallaga Valley, with 
some other 10,000 to 20,000 farms growing elsewhere.  These peasants sell their leaves 
for only 0.5% of the market value of the final cocaine product (McClintock, 1988). 
Table 8: Illegal Coca Production Numbers in Peru 1992-2000 
COCA 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
Net Cultivation (ha) 34,100 38,700 51,000 68,800 94,400 115,300 
Eradication (ha) 6,200 13,800 7,825 3,462 1,259 0 
Cultivation (ha) 40,200 52,500 58,825 72,262 95,659 115,300 
Leaf (Potential 
Harvest) (ha) 
60,975 69,200 95,600 130,600 174,700 183,600 
Cocaine (Potential) 
(mt) 
154 175 240 325 435 460 
Source: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2000. 
The guerrilla movement began in the early 1960s in Peru.  Hugo Blanco, a 
member of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party, shot and killed a police officer in 




months.  He also tried to establish a guerillas base on the mountains; however his 
revolutionary movement was generally not supported by the peasants. 
Following Blanco’s capture, at Puerto Maldonado, Special Forces brutally 
destroyed a group of future guerrillas who were returning from Cuba.  Javier Heraud, a 
famous poet was among the death people.  Two years after the killing of Heraud and his 
friends, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was founded by Hector Bejar, a survivor of 
the Special Forces attack in Puerto Maldonado.  At the same time the Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left (MIR), led by Luis de la Puente, began its own guerrilla campaign 
against the government.  In May, 1965, after spending several months setting up their 
bases of operation, MIR leaders met with ELN leaders on the barren Andean Plateau of 
Mesa Pelada in Cusco.  They produced a Revolutionary Proclamation that declared the 
beginning of armed resistance (Castro, 1999). 
This marked the first Peruvian guerrilla movement.  Political violence, however, 
escalated dramatically after Sendero Luminoso, or “Shinning Path,” started its armed 
struggle in the early 1980s.  The following figures in Table 9 demonstrate the increasing 
level of political violence in Peru. 
Table 9: Deaths due to political violence in Peru, by year since 1980: 
Year Death Year Death 
1980 12 1986 1,451 
1981 82 1987 1,115 
1982 193 1988 1,451 
1983 1977 1989 2,881 
1984 3,587 1990 3,708 
1985 1,476 1991 3,181 




The Shinning Path-SL (Sendero Luminoso) 
Sendero Luminoso (SL) is also known as “Communist Party of Peru on the 
Shinning Path of the Thought of Jose Carlos Mariategui.”  Mariategui (1895-1930), a 
Marxist writer and political leader, is known as the father of the Peruvian Left.  He 
inspired almost all of the Peru’s Marxist Parties.  His major literary work, Seven 
Interpretive Essays on Peru, is a Marxist evaluation of the socioeconomic situation in 
Peru.  This work forms the Sendero Luminoso’s perception of Peruvian reality.  
Mariategui proposes a socioeconomic system in which the elements of the Inca Empire’s 
social structure and modern socialist economic system are combined.  This naturally 
leads to a system that permits each Peruvian to have a sense of his rights and 
responsibilities in a collective national economy (Tarazona, 1990). 
 The Sendero Luminoso is the end result of several splits which have troubled the 
Peruvian Communist Movement since 1964 (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).  However, the 
group originates with the reopening of an old university in Ayacucho in 1959. The 
National University of San Cristobal de Humanga, a colonial university of Ayacucho, 
was founded in 1677, and it was close due to internal conflicts and reopened after a lapse 
of almost eighty years (Palmer, 1985).  At the time Ayacucho was a place where people 
believed that they had no social and economic mobility.  They were frustrated with their 
defected economy, permanent shortage of drinking water, limited production of energy, 
and inadequate means of communication. Due to these deficiencies the university became 
a fertile ground both for the people, who were eager to learn, and for the Peruvian 




professors led by Abimael Guzman Reynoso, the ultimate leader of the Shining Path later 
known as President Gonzalo (Wit & Gianotten, 1992). 
Abimael Guzman wove Mariategui’s philosophy into the working doctrine of the 
Sendero Luminoso by synthesizing it with the thought of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.  His 
new doctrine was designed specifically for Peru’s rural and urban classes, the Indians and 
Mestizos that Mariategui was concerned with.  By many, Guzman is considered “the 
forth sword of Marxism.”  His ideology is derived from the writings of the foremost 
communist thinker.  He built intellectually upon his Marxist base by studying the writings 
of Lenin.  As Lenin changed his party’s name to “communist” from “socialist” Guzman 
did the same thing to differentiate it from the social democratic strains of Marxism.  
Nevertheless, he was more greatly influenced by Mao Zedong than any other communist 
thinker.  He observed many similarities between pre-revolutionary China and his own 
Peru.  Namely, he believed Peru and China both had semi-feudal structures, large rural 
populations, and they both experienced extreme upheaval due to industrialization.  The 
Sendero Luminoso’s ideology, strategy of taking power through a “protracted march,” 
and military techniques are largely based on Mao’s ideas (Tarazona, 1990). 
Within the National University of San Cristobal de Humanga, the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) led by Guzman formed the nucleus of the Sendero Luminoso.  
For the first few years following the reopening of the university, Guzman recruited some 
of his most brilliant students for trips to Cuba and to help teach literacy, farming, and 
health and nutrition to the people of Ayacucho and the surrounding country side.  By 




these trips.  These people eventually emerged as leaders in The Sendero Luminoso’s 
hierarchy.  In 1965, the Huamanga command of the FLN split with the national 
organization due to a disagreement over the issue of opening the guerrilla fronts in the 
Peruvian highlands.  By 1966, Guzman and his followers at Huamanga were part of the 
Maoist Communist Party of Peru.  Between 1968 and 1970 relationship among party 
center and radicals in Huamanga got very tense because of the removal or withdrawal of 
Huamanga peripheries.  That was the time Guzman and his faction adopted the title of 
“Communist Party of Peru on the Shinning Path of the Thought of Jose Carlos 
Mariategui.” Subsequently, they were acknowledged as the Sendero Luminoso (Palmer, 
1985). 
In the first part of the 1970s, most of the teachers and students of the Huamanga 
University became members of the new party. The Sendero soon moved beyond 
Huamanga to begin its recruitment efforts among the Indian populations of Ayacucho, 
soon creating local cells in the surrounding departments of the region.  Two factors 
contributed to the fast, unobserved growth of The Sendero Luminoso in the region: The 
first contributing factor was the increasing conflict between Ayacucho’s strong regional 
outlook and the perspective of people from the outliving areas. Secondly, the ethnic 
fabric of the Ayacucho considered primarily of non-Spanish speaking peoples of the 
highlands.  They were frustrated and aggravated by the continued ignorance of the 
Peruvian mainstream.  Many students came from poor peasant families with the hope that 
they could improve their social and economic situations with a university degree.  Often, 




their past hopes faded as they realized that they faced the same poverty with their 
university degree as then had before.  They were right back where they started.  This 
inescapable poverty turned them into followers of organization’s causes.  The Sendero 
Luminoso believed that their path was the only true path to harmony, and it proposed a 
new, strictly hierarchical order where students, upon acceptance to the party and its truth, 
could move from the dirt of the village to the peak of the social pyramid (Degregori, 
1999). 
Between 1974 and 1977, some of the most radical leaders of the peasant unions of 
Apurimac Department of Peru joined the party, and in 1977 a decision was made to 
pursue armed struggle.  By 1977, another small, ultra-revolutionary faction of the 
Bandera Roja Party, the Puka Llacta, also joined the Sendero Luminoso (Radu and 
Tismaneanu, 1990).  The work of the Sendero Luminoso first took public form during the 
1980 elections when followers burned ballot boxes in the Indian community market town 
of Chuschi.  They also hung dogs from lampposts in both Ayacucho and Lima.  The 
strategic bombings of public and private buildings in late 1980 and 1981 slowly gave way 
to attacks on local public figures.  Violence on a much larger scale began after a massive 
raid on the Ayacucho prison in March 1982 (Manwaring, 1995). 
The SL is composed of national, regional, and local level organizations. The 
National Central Committee is composed of Guzman and a few top lieutenants that 
control and direct the organization. This group determines the ideology, strategy and 
policy directions for the entire organization.  It also oversees the movement’s operations 




handle the planning and evaluation of the Sendero Luminoso activities within their 
individual regions.  They, in turn, oversee cells of local partisans and part time activists.  
Regional commanders are allowed to enjoy significant degree autonomy by The National 
Committee. This independence is mostly due to geographical limitations that bounds 
periodic controls over subordinates, and the need to maintain efficient military operations 
that requires effective leadership.  However, ideology and policy decisions are strictly 
determined by the National Committee.  According to Peruvian Police, as of the mid-
1990s the Sendero has developed managerial units that help coordinate the regional 
armies and strengthen communication between the National Central committee and 
Regional subdivisions. These new units are known as the Department for Organizational 
Support, Group of Popular Support, Department of Finance, and Department of Internal 
Relations (Tarazano, 1992).   
At its height in mid-1992, it was believed that the Shining Path had between 3,000 
and 4,000 armed cadres and 50,000 supporters in various civilian support groups and 
political cadres.  However, this estimate does not include the mobilized population in 
favor of the Shining Path, like the coca-growing peasants.  Table 10 shows the evolution 
of the estimated number of armed cadres of Shining Path from 1986 to 1997. 
The most noticeable ideological characteristic of the Sendero Luminoso is its 
uncompromising dogmatism.  It considers early 1930s’ Stalinism, pure Maoism, and 
Khmer Rouge as the only acceptable social models. The group rejects today’s all Marxist 
regimes as reformist and treasonous, and it reserves its most vituperative attacks for Deng 




unreservedly recognizes the need for certain Castroite rural warfare, including the 
replacement of the vanguard party with the guerilla nucleus.  Nevertheless, this 
acceptance does not show the willingness of the SL to moderate its “true” Maoist theory 
and practice.   
Table 10: The Shining Path’s Armed Cadres 1986-1997 
Year Cadres Year Cadres 
1986 Up to 2,000 1992 Up to between 4,000 
and 5,000 
1987 Up to 2,000 1993 Up to between 4,000 
and 5,000 
1988 Up to 2,000 1994 Up to 3,000 
1989 Up to between 4,000 
and 5,000 
1995 An estimated 3,000 
1990 Up to between 4,000 
and 5,000 
1996 An estimated 3,000 
1991 Up to between 4,000 
and 5,000 
1997 An estimated 1,500 
Source: When All the Evils Come Together: Cocaine, Corruption, and Shining Path in 
Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, 1980 to 1995. 
 
To a large degree, the SL’s ideology is similar to Mao’s throughout the Cultural 
Revolution and Khmer Rouge’s between 1975 and 1978.  The group supports the total 
destruction of the market economy and the subsequent creation of an exclusively rural, 
collectivist economy of small cooperative villages.  For the Sendero Luminoso, but 
power, everything is an illusion and this power must be used to establish the fourth stage 
of Socialism exclusively through armed force (Radu & Tismaneanu, 1990).   
Four themes are predominant in Guzman’s philosophies: the primacy of class 




and the necessity of violence to be able to overthrow the old system and create a new one 
(Starn, 1995).   In addition, Guzman envisions a five-stage attack plan to successfully 
empower the people: 
- Phase 1: Agitation and propaganda to convert backward areas into advanced 
and solid bases of revolutionary support, 
- Phase 2: Sabotage and guerrilla action to attack bourgeois state and revisionist 
element symbols, 
- Phase 3: Generalized violence and develop guerrilla war tactics, 
- Phase 4: Conquest and expansion of support bases 
- Phase 5: The fall of the cities and total collapse of the state. 
The fourth phase of this popular war program led the Sendero Luminoso to trade 
of illegal drug to finance its activities.  The Sendero Luminoso also had several other 
reasons to increase its base of revenue.  Firstly, the Sendero Luminoso became a massive 
organization with 3000-6000 active armed militants and a support network of about 
50,000 people in the country side and in the urban areas of Peru by the mid 1980s. 
Secondly, local funds were the primary source for its operations.  It strictly stayed away 
from foreign support bases, but the poor peasant of the region were not sufficient sources 
of revenue.  Lastly, the expansion of Sendero Luminoso operations into urban areas after 
the preliminary rural campaign required more militants, more support bases and more 
money (Palmer, 1992). 
 The Sendero Luminoso’s growing need for new financial resources was expanded 




need more sophisticated equipment than dynamite, their primary weapon poorly trained 
and equipped local police forces.  The Upper Huallaga Valley, one of the richest coca-
growing areas in the world, presented the SL the opportunity to solve its financial 
problems.  There the Sendero Luminoso was able to extort money from coca-grower and 
traffickers.  The group earned enough money through this venture to finance its 
revolutionary efforts at the national level (Dreyfus, 1999).   
The Upper Huallaga Valley’s financial potential is well summarized by Tarazano.  
Each hectare of coca planted in the Upper Huallaga Valley produces at least two metric 
tons of leaves yearly.  Growers sell each ton of leaves to middlemen for around 600 
dollars.  These leaves are then transported to clandestine laboratories for processing into 
cocaine paste. The Valley covers some 211,000 hectares of coca fields.  200,000 of these 
fields produce coca for illegal markets.  Only twenty-one kilogram of semi-refined 
cocaine paste is derived from each metric ton of dried coca leaves. Traffickers buy this 
semi refined cocaine for 890 dollars per kilogram and take it to hidden labs in rain forests 
of Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil.  They then refine it into pure cocaine. One 
kilogram of pure cocaine requires 3 kilograms of coca paste.  Therefore one ton of coca 
leaves generated only seven kilograms of pure cocaine.  When all is said and done, 
Peruvian coca farms yield an estimated 28 billion dollars in the U.S. market (Tarazano, 
1990). 
The SL started its political campaign in the Upper Huallaga Valley in 1980.  A 
number of militants went to Puerto Pizana and Aucayacu at that time and settled as coca 




later.  The Peruvian Government, however, did not know of the existence of the SL in the 
area until a joint DEA-Peruvian Police anti-drug operation uncovered the group.  During 
the operation, police discovered the Sendero Luminoso’ schools and coca paste 
laboratories.  Consequently, police arrested several members of the organization.  After a 
short time, Tito Jaime, mayor of the place was murdered.  He was also the chief organizer 
of the coca growers.  Even though the Sendero Luminoso did not claim responsibility for 
the killing, it is well known that the Sendero Luminoso had a history of opposing any 
organization that could challenge its supremacy.  Jaime’s organization was clearly one of 
them (Gonzalez, 1992).  The guerrillas play on the peasants' hostility toward eradication 
campaigns financed by the U.S.  They also capitalize on their antipathy of drug dealers, 
who pay the lowest price possible for coca leaves and coca paste. The growers welcomed 
the Shining Path's offers to protect them from Peru's anti-drug police and to press drug 
traffickers for higher coca prices on their behalf (Tammen, 1991).   
Esperanza states that by the mid 1980s, the Sendero Luminoso had established a 
reliable financial source through its alliance with drug traffickers. Some estimates 
indicate that this alliance yields to an annual income of between $20 and $50 million 
(Esperanza, 1992).  At the end of 1988, the valley road was controlled by the Sendero 
Luminoso.  The group charged every vehicle a fee to pass.  The peasants’ support for the 
SL and its control over the Upper Huallaga Valley was based on the desire to defend and 
increase coca crops rather than popular support of the political causes of the organization. 




profitable in the region due to coca production which is estimated to yield nearly two 
billion dollars a year (Olarte, 1993). 
In 1992, the capture of President Gonzalo revealed some evidence of drug-
guerrilla connection.  Many terrorists and their records were seized by Peruvian Police. 
Among the seized records, an “Economic Balance of the Shinning Path” document, dated 
1991, was particularly important because it revealed the Sendero Luminoso’s connection 
to drug trade.  The “economic balance” was essentially a detailed ledger of the groups’ 
income and expenses.  It indicated charges of $3,000 to $7,000 per flight for drug planes 
leaving the Valley.  During the same period of time, Peru’s most famous drug trafficker 
Demetrio Limoniel Chavez Penaherrera, also known as Vaticano, was arrested in 
Colombia and extradited to Peru.  Vaticano himself, and the captured terrorists he dealt 
with who were also in custody stated that Vaticano supplied arms to the Sendero 
Luminoso and had paid $5,000 per flight plus a per fee of three dollars for the coca paste 
transported in the plane (Clawson & Lee, 1996). 
Some U.S. reports estimate that the annual revenues gathered by the SL from its 
activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley range from $10 million to $100 million, most of 
which come from protection services.  As mentioned earlier, these fees along with 
protection fees extorted from coca growers, were the main sources for Sendero Luminoso 
income (INCSR, 1999).  
The budget of the Sendero Luminoso is not used strictly to purchase new 




Wages must be paid to militants, monetary support goes to families, and fees are paid to 
the Sendero Luminoso lawyers.   
Besides cash the Sendero Luminoso enjoys advantages by being in touch with 
drug traffickers.  Before its interaction with the drug trade, the Sendero Luminoso was 
solely dependent on the arms and ammunition that it seized from government forces and 
dynamite it stole from local mines.  The Sendero Luminoso soon discovered that drug 
traffickers had international links to arms smugglers and could get sophisticated 
equipment.  The group was able to arm its units with better weaponry and execute more 
violent and successful attacks. From the time it contacted with the drug lords, the SL has 
been intensely upgraded (Hamack, 1993). 
Ever since the SL leader Guzman’s arrest in Colombia and subsequent extradition 
to Peru, the Sendero Luminoso has turned out to be a mere shadow of itself.  The group 
has fallen apart.  One of its cells has abandoned armed struggle due to the orders of the 
arrested Guzman.  However, another cell, led by Oscar Alberto Ramirez, also known 
President Feliciano, has chosen the hard line and continued to terrorize Peru with money 
coming mainly from the drug business.  Some weapons and communication devices were 
captured after combat with the Ramirez Fraction in 1994.  These items were found to 
have originated from Waldo Vargas’s drug trafficking group.  Nevertheless, drug barons 
did not finance the Sendero Luminoso due to a political interest or sympathy, they did 
because they were too weak to oppose the Sendero Luminoso and its executions 
(Clawson, 1996).  Tammen (1991) summarizes the Sendero Luminoso’s situation by 




over growers, Colombian traffickers, and lab operators, insisting that they follow the 
fixed prices of the Sendero Luminoso organization.  In fact, the group infrequently killed 
traffickers and coca growers who will not follow its price instructions. 
Some people disagree with perceptions of a drug-insurgency nexus in Peru.  They 
argue that there has never been enough evidence to substantiate these allegations, stating 
that too little is known of the Sendero Luminoso to make such assumptions.  Rather, such 
claims are part of a U.S.-backed propaganda campaign to link the Latin American Left to 
the immoral drug business (MacDonald, 1988).  These complaints are very similar to 
those of the FARC leaders who object the statements connecting their guerrillas with the 
illegal drug trade.  These objections are the by product of a problem that was explained in 
previous chapters: “your terrorist is my freedom fighter.”  No author who is sympathetic 
to socialist or communist beliefs will accept that a Maoist “guerrilla” would commit such 
a nefarious act, especially not the Sendero Luminoso who fights the sake of communism 
to free the people from the tyranny of capitalism.     
Nevertheless, there is evidence to support the conviction that the Sendero 
Luminoso, like the FARC and the M-19, did not miss the opportunity to generate much-
needed income by involving itself in the drug business.  This involvement allowed the 
groups to develop a more sophisticated arsenal to conduct a more effective war against its 
capitalist enemies.  However, it is odd that such a devoutly communist guerrilla group 
was as opportunistic as any capitalist when it came to making money.  It is also odd that 




by the same people who can not accept the communist Sendero Luminoso’s involvement 




























CONCLUSIVE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Other Narco-terrorism Examples 
The FARC, the SL and the M-19 are not the only terrorist organizations involved 
in the illicit drug business.  It is likely that terrorist organization that is desperate for 
immediate financial support would use any means necessary to get the needed revenue.  
An analysis of two additional “narco-terrorist” organizations will provide the opportunity 
to compare the three groups examined in Chapter Two with terrorist organizations 
operating in other parts of the world that are involved in drug trafficking. 
Other Examples of Narco-Terrorism Cases 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (The LTTE) 
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (The LTTE) is a known terrorist 
organization originated and mostly operating in Sri Lanka.  This group has been known 
to finance its operations by trafficking in drugs, and is therefore considered to be a narco-
terrorist group. 
 The struggle of Tamil dates back to the ninetieth century. Tamils make up 
eighteen percent of the total population of Sri Lanka, a country formerly known as 
Ceylon.  Following the British invasion of the island in 1815, Britain enacted the tried 
and trice practice of divide and conquer.  This policy sowed the seeds of the current 




During and shortly after the British reign in Sri Lanka, the Tamils were given a 
disproportionate of upper level jobs within the government.  The Sinhalese, though they 
made up three-fourths of the population, were a political minority.  Today, however, the 
tide has turned.  The Sinhalese have become increasingly better educated.  As a result, 
they have gained high ranking jobs and have gained the political majority.  Once the 
Sinhalese got into power, they sought to redress the balance with populist and 
discriminatory policies against the Tamils.  They formulated policies that restricted 
admission to the university, established a biased system for the recruiting of government 
jobs, and colonized Tamil areas, thereby creating an army of unemployed and frustrated 
young Tamil men. Dissatisfied with the non-violent parliamentary approach of their 
middle class leaders, who generally belonged to the high castes, the Tamil youth chose to 
blaze their own trail by turning to open violence (Vaidik, 1986). 
The starting point of the Tamil Tigers’ armed struggle dates back to July 23, 
1983; following the killing of thirteen government soldiers in the Tamil stronghold of 
Jaffna by an ambush; wide-spread anti-Tamil riots across the country caused the deaths 
of over six hundred people.  Since then, Tamil Tigers have waged a guerilla campaign 
using terrorism as both a prelude to guerilla warfare and a way to support uniformed 
guerillas in the field (Smith, 1999). 
Several factors made illicit drug business possible for the LTTE.  The geographic 
position of the territory where the LTTE operates has played a key role.  This area 
encompasses one of the main drug transit routes leading out of the Golden Triangle.   




LTTE’s region includes this route which extends from the Indian Sea to the inner parts of 
India where fifty million Tamils live.  The LTTE also has naval fleet containing deep sea 
going vessels that can be used for drug trafficking purposes.  The LTTE’s drug 
distribution efforts are also facilitated by the fact that 500,000 Tamil expatriates reside in 
developed, drug-consuming countries.   
The LTTE’s involvement in drug trafficking have been carefully observed by 
several international organizations.  Interpol reports that the most financially beneficial 
activities for the LTTE are drug trafficking, donations, trafficking in refugees, selling of 
the publications, the Internet, and the extortion of Tamil’s expatriates. According to 
Interpol, among the seizures made in Europe and North America, there have been 
noteworthy indications that the LTTE is either directly or indirectly involved in illicit 
drug trade.  They at least get a certain proportion of the proceeds from some of the 
trafficking that occurs (Interpol, 1999).  The Drug Enforcement Administration depicts 
Some reports by Indian police officials in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu that 
indicate that illicit drug trafficking activities take place among Tamil Refugees living 
there. They also believe that the LTTE uses drug trafficking to finance its insurgent 
movement (INCSR, 2000). 
The Mackenzie Institute, a non-profit research group based in Toronto, has 
documented the worldwide arrests of several Tamils with links to the LTTE for drug 
running since the early 1980s.  Among those arrestees, a top the LTTE member, 
Manoharan was arrested in France for possession of heroin and sentenced to two years 




to pay a monthly salary to his family while he was in jail, suspicions that the heroin 
belonged to the LTTE was raised.  The Mackenzie Institute’s research revealed that the 
LTTE raised money by running drugs, particularly heroin from Southeast and Southwest 
Asia.  The most profitable LTTE activities have been in the form of heroin trafficking 
(Chalk, 2000). 
  The Observatorie Geopolitique Des Drouges (OGD) (1999) maintains that the 
LTTE traffics drugs with a great deal of caution to avoid accusations from the 
international community. The arrest of two LTTE militants in Katmandu in 1996 with 
fake German passports and 500 grams of heroin is an example of that.  The seizure of 
14.5 kilos of heroin following a Tamil terrorist’s arrest after a shoot out in 1999 in New 
Delhi is considered by OGD to be solid evidence of the link between organized crime and 
the Tamil guerilla movement. 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
As mentioned in the Chapter One, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) is another 
narco-terrorist organization.  It operates mainly in south-eastern Turkey and has cells and 
satellite organizations all around the Middle East and Europe.  The PKK is one of the 
most brutal terrorist organizations in existence.  During its eighteen-year bloody 
campaign against Turkey, over 30,000 people were killed. 
The founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan was a student in the Political Science 
Faculty of Ankara University.  He was inspired by the revolutionary leftist ideas of the 
Turkish People’s Liberation Army and became a member of the left-wing Revolutionary 




the Kurds in Southern Turkey.  Turkish leftists led him to advocate in a “Kurdish 
National Liberation Movement.”  He subsequently abandoned the Turkish leftist 
movement, starting his own radical movement that called for Kurdish independence and 
the creation of a completely separate, autonomous Kurdish State (Poulton, 1997).   
To be able to establish a political party, Ocalan mostly studied the theories of 
well-known revolutionary thinkers between 1974 and 1978. Therefore, in 1978, the PKK 
was formally established to encourage a communist revolution through the use of guerilla 
warfare.  Its goal was to create a separate Kurdish state (Criss, 1995).  In November 
1978, the PKK was founded by six central committee members, and their undisputed 
leader Abdullah Ocalan and his wife.  The group originated in a village in Diyarbakir, a 
province of Turkey, and proscribed the Marxist-Leninist ideology.  Later in 1979, Ocalan 
went to Syria to arrange for the preparation of suitable training facilities.  As a result 
PKK recruits were able train in Palestinian camps until their first strike in 1984 (Gunter, 
1997).   
By the beginning of the 1980s, PKK militants penetrated back into Turkey. 
However it was in August 1984, when the PKK started its armed terrorist campaign 
against Turkey, that the Turkish officials realized the real threat of the PKK (Barkey, 
1998). Since then, the PKK constitute a growing threat to the state.  Vacuum of state 
power in Northern Iraq due to the Gulf War created a relevant ground for PKK to 
establish permanent bases there.  
A decade after its initial strike, the PKK became one of the most vigorous and 




countries with its active cadres of tens of thousands of guerrillas and several hundred 
thousand active supporters (Gunter, 1997). This broad offensive campaign required 
bigger and better financial support. Generally, by looking at the financial sources of 
terrorist organizations it becomes obvious that some of the terrorist organizations do not 
hesitate to involve themselves in illicit drug trafficking to finance their activities.  The 
PKK is no exception to this trend. It uses every possible alternative to gain financial 
power.  
The PKK’s existing structure allows them to be accurately carried out their armed 
campaign and traffic in drugs.  A range of front organizations, disguised as socio-cultural 
associations and so-called “information centers” are manipulated and guided by the 
PKK’s popular front. These groups provide the necessary political, moral, and monetary 
support for the PKK to survive.  By the early 1990s, European countries began to 
sympathize with the Kurds, opening their borders to let many PKK members immigrate 
to Europe among the thousands of refugees. This created a very useful network for the 
PKK’s drug operations.  While armed guerillas cooperated with traffickers along Balkan 
smuggling route, hundreds of front organizations were flourishing in the drug-consuming 
European countries (Republic, 1995). 
There are several incidents that clearly indicate the PKK’s involvement in the 
illegal drug business.  A former PKK leader, Selim Çürükkaya, after being sentenced to 
death by his own organization, escaped to Germany and stated that he has made a 
substantial amount of money from the drug business.  Frankfurt’s Chief Prosecutor 




that the money made through drug trafficking was used to obtain weapons (Gunter, 
1997).  According to Turkish Drug Report, Hakki KITAY, leader of the KITAY drug 
trafficking network, subsequent to his arrest in 1996, stated that he has smuggled drugs 
for the PKK and transferred the money to the organization through Selim Çürükkaya, at 
that time, financial affairs officer of the PKK in Germany.  Kitay exposed additional 
information indicating his connection with the terrorist organization by mentioning that 
his brother was killed in an armed clash between security forces. His son, after training in 
the Bekaa Mahsun Korkmaz Training Academy of the PKK, became a member of the 
ARGK field unit under field commander Mahmut Çürükkaya (brother of Selim 
Çürükkaya).  He joined the meetings of the organization in which they discussed the 
transport of heroin from Turkey to Europe (Republic, 1998). 
 A 1999 Turkish Drug Report indicates that “it has been brought to public 
attention by both the works of the Turkish Narcotic Police within its organization, and 
joint work with its European counterparts that the PKK organizes illicit drug trafficking.” 
Furthermore, the Turkish law enforcement agencies successfully proved the link between 
The PKK and 138 drug cases in which more than twenty tons of illegal drugs were 
seized. 
Comparing the FARC, the SL, the M-19, the LTTE, and the PKK 
The FARC, the SL, the M-19, the LTTE, and the PKK are all insurgent/terrorist 
organizations who have used illegal drugs to finance their terrorist activities.  The 
similarities among these groups reveal some facts that may be helpful to understand the 




from each other, they reflect similarities in ideology, organizational structure, types of 
operations, degrees of cruelty, and methods of making money. 
 These five insurgent/terrorist organizations follow leftist ideologies.  While four 
of them founded their bases on Marxist-Leninist ideology, the SL strictly sticks with 
Maoist ideology.  Nonetheless, despite those ideologies’ opposition to nationalist 
policies, all of them hold strong nationalist ideas that contradict their original manifesto.  
In other words, these groups claim to have formed for the purpose of creating a society 
where everyone is equal, yet they exploit and terrorize those who do not support their 
ideas of nationalism.  Furthermore, it is safe to say that the founders and leaders of these 
groups chose communist ideologies at least partly because knew that they would get 
support from some countries and organizations with the same ideology.  It is no 
coincidence that so many twentieth century insurgent movements claimed to be 
communist. 
At this point, it is necessary to discuss the marginalization of some groups by 
exploiting the term “Marxism.”  In other words some governments and interest groups 
abuse the term “Marxism” to distort groups that carry undesired ideologies.  According to 
Marxism, history is seen as basically a series of class struggles. Classes are defined in 
terms of their relation to the means of production.  According to Marx, each period of 
history has a “dominant” economic class and a developing or “rising” economic class. In 
time, a conflict breaks out between the dominant and rising classes.  This conflict results 
in the overthrow of the old ruling dominant class and the establishment of the new rising 




As a consequence of the industrial revolution, modern times witnessed the 
replacement of feudalism with capitalism as the dominant class system. Marx maintains 
that modern societies are now polarized into two classes: the dominant capitalist class, 
which he named the bourgeoisie, and the rising, working-class, which he called the 
proletariat. According to Marx, if the working-class could overcome the ruling 
bourgeoisie to establish a classless, socialist-communist society, this ancient class 
conflict will come to an end. Eternal justice and peace would exist ever after. This 
overthrow of the bourgeoisie is the only way to break the vicious cycle of class conflict 
and the subjugation of the society to the dominant class.  
In order to realize this fundamental change in the structure of society, there must 
be a revolution. The overthrow of the capitalist regime requires an organized rebellion 
rather than an evolutionary process. In parallel with this mentality, most Marxist groups 
often translate this idea of rebellion into armed conflict, opting for a campaign of 
organized violence against capitalist rulers. 
 It is a fact that there is no consensus on the definition of the word terrorism. It is 
widely agreed upon, however, that when groups with political aims can not realize their 
ideals through legitimate channels, they may adopt terrorism as a means to reach their 
goals. Marxists frequently find that they cannot realize their dream of revolution through 
legitimate means.  For this reason, historically, Marxist groups campaign or propagandize 
for armed conflict against established capitalist rulers. As a consequence, they are often 




 Taylor and Vanden (1982) argue that there are number of factors that affect the 
difficulty of describing terrorism.  When exploited, these factors have the effect of 
distorting the truth.  Associating certain groups of people with actions or ideologies that 
are widely presumed to be evil greatly influences public opinion.  The public morally and 
legally objects to those who are labeled as terrorist. Distracted by their disdain, the public 
then does not realize the real nature of the sovereign’s interest in those people.  For 
example, Americans presume that terrorism is an act committed by terrible people.  
According to Taylor and Vanden, the terms “revolutionary movement,” “guerrilla 
warfare,” and “communist-supported terrorism” intensify this ideological opinion. They 
play to sentiment rather than intellect.  
 Violence is another commonality among these insurgent/terrorist organizations.  
The operations that were conducted by these groups left people of all ages, sexes, and 
nationalities either injured or dead.  In fact, violence is the primary strategic tool that 
terrorist groups prefer.  They all illegitimately use force to achieve their political 
objectives, terrifying and intimidating people who do not support their cause.    
Interestingly, these groups all share a common geographical thread.  They all 
operate in places where illegal drug production and trafficking are at their peaks. For 
example, the FARC and the M-19 operate in Colombia’s most active coca cultivating and 
cocaine producing areas, and the SL operates in the same position in Peru.  The LTTE 
has the advantage of being very close to one of the main heroin producing region of the 
world, the Golden Triangle between Burma, Laos, and Thailand.  The PKK is mainly 




Southwest Asian heroin that is transported to Europe from the Golden Crescent Region of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.  Synthetic drugs from Europe also pass through Turkey 
in route to the Middle East.  In essence, all of these groups take advantage of their 
geographic positions to gain extreme financial power by capitalizing on the already 
existing illegal drug trade. 
The drug trade provides profit to these terrorist groups in more than one way.  In 
addition to simply dealing drugs for money, all of these groups extorted money from 
established drug traffickers.  This money was either paid to buy “protection” or was 
simply considered to be a tax due to the rightful rulers of the land.  In this case, any 
merchandise that is subject to trade was taxed.  Of course, the legality of the trade is not 
an issue as long as it pays a good amount of tax.  Their mutual ideologies, like many 
other ideologies, oppose drug abuse and see it as a capitalist tactic intended to subjugate 
opponents.  However, the groups have all ignored their ideological objections ironically 
choosing to earn as much money as possible by continuing their lucrative trade. 
Finally, all of these groups have gone to great lengths to cover their involvement 
in the illegal drug business.  Since drug trafficking is considered as a crime against 
humanity by the international community, these insurgent/terrorist organizations always 
deny their involvement and condemn such acts.  Nevertheless, they lost their credibility 
within many supportive countries and sympathetic international organizations when these 
nations and organizations discovered that all these insurgent/terrorist groups involved to 





Typology of Narco-terrorism 
It is clear that ‘narco-terrorism’ is as controversial as its predecessor ‘terrorism.’  
It is also obvious that there is no consensus among academicians or state officials on the 
issue of defining narco-terrorism.  However, some conclusive descriptions can be drawn 
because the concepts used to define narco-terrorism are not unlimited.  Most of these 
concepts are discussed by the authors cited in this paper.  Moreover, there is no need for 
there to be a ‘one and only one’ definition of a concept, especially if this concept is as 
multi-dimensional as narco-terrorism.  Table 11 provides an organized synopsis of 
several likely possible existing types of narco-terrorism, their function, and their purpose. 
Narco-terrorist activities primarily have two main dimensions: political and 
economical.  In some cases narco-terrorist activity may carry both dimensions.  Political 
narco-terrorism seeks to achieve political ends.  In this type of narco-terrorism, the 
groups that are involved use the monetary power that they gain from the illegal drug 
business to achieve their political goals. They use the money for propaganda purposes, in 
elections, for the candidates who support their political agenda, to fund candidates who 
are secretly one of their own, create cells in different locations, bribe government 
officials and so on.  
The first type of political narco-terrorism is the actual narco-terrorism.  This type 
of narco-terrorism, beyond any other types that have been discussed or will be discussed 
in this paper, is the most common idea people have in mind when they think about 
“narco-terrorism.”  Actual narco-terrorism is the direct involvement of terrorist 




Table 11: Narco-terrorism Typology 
  Types                 Method of Operation  Purpose 
 
Actual Narco-terrorism 
Direct involvement of 
terrorist organizations 
in some or all phases of 
drug trafficking. 
Financing their terrorist 
activities, purchasing 
arms and ammunition 
1. Providing 
protection for drug 
traffickers. 









3. Actual insurgent 





power to lance their 
political agenda and 
accumulating the 
arsenal necessary to 














bringing about a change 

















Myth Narco-terrorism  
Exaggerating or 
making up linkages 
between 
insurgent/terrorist 
groups and the illegal 
drug business by using 
political power 
Getting domestic and 
international support 
for imposing national 











Controlling the drug 
trade through secret 
governmental agencies 
or actually using these 
agencies to traffic 
drugs  
Obtaining financial 
power for the secret 
operations that cannot 
be carried out openly 



















phases of this illegal business.  Some terrorist organizations control the trade from 
production to distribution.  They engage the production of the crops that make the base 
material for the actual drug, and then they establish labs to produce the final product.  
After the drug is ready, they transport or arrange to transport the drugs to consuming 
areas, finally distributing them by using their members as dealers and their cells as 
storage. 
All of the insurgent/terrorist organizations that have been mentioned in this study 
have been involved in one or more phases of illicit drug trafficking.  For example, the 
FARC has been active in the coca crop cultivation, lab operations, and exportation of 
cocaine, providing cocaine to the Mexican cartel in exchange for money and, most likely 
weapons.  The SL has also been heavily involved in coca production in Peru’s Upper 
Huallaga Valley.  It also would put pressure on growers, Colombian traffickers, and lab 
operators to follow pre-fixed coca, coca paste, and cocaine prices.  The SL would often 
kill traffickers and coca growers who did not obey its price instructions. The M-19 used 
its guerillas as drug traffickers in the Guillot-Lara episode.  The LTTE trafficked drugs 
via their shipping fleet, and distributed them by the hand of some of the 500,000 Tamil 
expatriates residing mainly in the developed drug consuming countries.  The PKK was 
active in almost every phases of illegal drug trafficking.  They had labs in Iran, Northern 
Iraq and Southeastern Turkey where they converted base-morphine to heroine by using 
acetic acid anhydride.  Then they traffic the resulting heroine using the Balkan Route and 





The next type of narco-terrorism is Insurgent narco-terrorism.  This type differs 
from actual narco-terrorism in only one way: Insurgent narco-terrorists have grassroots-
level political agendas.  Groups with insurgent characteristics have a foundation and 
structure that is different from terrorist organizations.  Some insurgent groups may only 
be involved in the illegal drug business in different levels with an indirect or direct 
manner.  One way of insurgent groups become indirectly involved is by providing 
security for drug traffickers who are professional criminals.  For example, the Medellin 
Cartel’s clandestine laboratories in Yuri, Colombia were guarded by forty to sixty FARC 
guerillas.  When government forces infiltrated, these forces fought to the end.   
Insurgent groups may also be indirectly involved with drug trafficking through 
the taxation of producers and traffickers.  The SL taxes everyone who has a business in 
Upper Huallaga Valley.  They get a certain percentage of the value of every smuggled 
cocaine or cocaine base from the region.  Furthermore, some seized documents show that 
the SL charges three thousand dollars to seven thousand dollars per flight for drug planes 
leaving the Valley. 
 State-sponsored narco-terrorism is another type of political narco-terrorism.  This 
type of narco-terrorism may occur when some states support and sponsor terrorist 
organizations that engage in illicit drug trafficking.  In this case, the supporting states do 
not back terrorist organizations due to their involvement in a lucrative business; these 
states seek a changing in the political system by destabilizing governments in the 
countries where these narco-terrorist organizations operate.  In order to destabilize target 




promote terrorism and illegal drug trafficking.  Among their opponents these states create 
terrorist organizations, support them with every means of transportation and weapons 
available and have them attack conventional government institutions to undermine the 
existing system.  They also tolerate and even support the involvement of their terrorist 
organizations in the illegal drug business.  They know that by bringing drugs to other 
nations, they shake the cultural and political foundations of the society.  
As discussed in previous chapters, the Cuban government did not hesitate to 
support almost all of the Marxist-Leninist insurgent/terrorist organizations in Latin 
America and elsewhere.  Havana provided guerilla and political training to these terrorist 
organizations, and also, as was the case with Guillot-Lara episode, helped them to 
smuggle arms and drugs to finance their activities.  Cuba and its brother communist 
nations would back communist terrorist organizations regardless of the legality or 
illegality of their activities.  In fact, in recent history they have not been interested in 
distinctions between the two. 
 Myth narco-terrorism is the last type of political narco-terrorism.  This type of 
narco-terrorism is artificial.  Myth narco-terrorism occurs when a non-narcotic terrorist 
group is falsely linked with the drug trade in order to create a negative image of the 
group.  Some states may generate such an artificial situation by exaggerating or making 
up linkages between insurgent groups and the illegal drug business to generate a domestic 
and international support for imposing its own policies in the region.  In these cases, the 
conventional belief that illegal drug trafficking as a crime against humanity is taken 




propaganda, the accused groups generally loose the sympathy and support of the society 
at large. 
Scott (1991), in his book “Cocaine Politics,” argues that narco-terrorism is an 
artificial term that was created by the Reagan administration in order to restore public 
support for the Administration’s campaign against Nicaragua, an area believed to be a 
dangerous base of the communist bloc.  The fear of communism in American society 
however was not prominent as it once was due to the failure of the Vietnam War and 
growing relations between the United States and many communist countries.  The 
administration then invented narco-terrorism as a propaganda tool, linking two evils of 
drugs.  The term was used by the Reagan administration as a political rather than 
analytical tool.  Both President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz clearly 
declared that narco-terrorism was the danger most threatening to the Western hemisphere 
and, it was supported by communist nations.  Beyond these political maneuvers, Scott 
claims that the United States controversially waged a secret war against Nicaragua by 
generating and sponsoring their own narco-terrorists within the Contras.  Following 
Reagan’s example some right-wing Latin American military forces also used the term 
‘narco-terrorism’ as a necessary addition to their national security policy in order to 
rationalize their oppressive domestic actions. 
State-employed narco-terrorism has both the political and economic 
characteristics of narco-terrorism.  Similar to state-sponsored narco-terrorism, State-
employed narco-terrorism seeks to make changes in the political system of the target 




terrorism.  However, State-employed narco-terrorism is primarily concerned with the 
monetary advantages of being affiliated with terrorism and the drug trade.  These states 
secretly use their own governmental agencies to traffic drugs in order to pad the states 
coffers.  The political advantages of bringing drugs to other countries are simply an 
added bonus.  The money they earn is then dedicated to armed struggles, engaging their 
troops to terrorize their opponents. 
Turkey provides an example of the implications of this type of narco-terrorism.  
Turkey was chosen by the USSR as a prime target for low-intensity warfare in late 1960s.  
The Soviets chose Turkey for several reasons.  Their primary goal was to weaken a major 
ally of the United States and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) outpost.  
First, Moscow launched major disinformation operations about Turkey’s relations with 
the West. They used every available means of propaganda, even establishing clandestine 
radio stations that continuously broadcast against Turkey’s existing democratic system.   
As result of these intensive black propaganda operations to create a chaotic atmosphere, 
the continual efforts of Moscow and its close ally Bulgaria brought terrorism to its peak 
at the end of the 1970s.  In 1980, an average of 28 people was killed every day.  These 
terrorist campaigns were financed through the trade of arms and ammunition, and drugs.  
A multipurpose Bulgarian state trading agency, Kintex, was used as a main provider of 
weapons and necessary funds to support the ongoing terrorism.  Bulgarian trucks carried 
weapons among their legitimate shipments of tomato paste and machinery.  These trucks 
traveled to the Middle East, and brought back illegal drugs originating from sources as 




The last type of narco-terrorism is criminal narco-terrorism, and it falls under the 
heading economic narco-terrorism.  Criminal narco-terrorism is used solely for financial 
benefits.  It occurs when drug trafficking organizations employ terrorist-like tactics to 
deter, terrify and intimidate states, citizens, and agents who threaten their lucrative 
business.  The first aim of these heinous organizations is to protect and increase their 
financial interest.  The violence they use is no less severe than the violence terrorist use. 
Latin American cocaine cartels constitute the best example for this type of narco-
terrorism.  The Medellin Cartel is the most famous and vicious among them.  The 
Medellin Cartel was formed in 1982 as a response to the kidnapping of a member of the 
Ochoa family by the M-19 guerrillas.  The cocaine smugglers became conscious of their 
vulnerability to this type of extortion due to their wealth.  The traffickers got together and 
each donated $7.5 million to the formation of a paramilitary force to fight the guerillas. It 
was at this time that drug barons started to work together in a more coordinated and 
cooperative way (Filippone, 1994).  Later, this paramilitary force was very often used to 
assassin politicians and police and army officers who opposed their illicit drug 
trafficking.  This group did not hesitate to employ terrorist-like tactics, such as bombing, 
and wide-spread violence. 
Recommendations 
As discussed above narco-terrorism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  The 
first dimension “narco,” or the illegal drug business, has three sides: production, 
trafficking, and consumption.  Every step of this illegal trade must be studied separately 




should not affect the desired final outcome, namely the elimination of all phases of the 
illegal drug problem.  Every phase should receive the importance and attention it 
deserves, not one degree more or less. 
The production phase is a two-step process: the cultivation of the crops that make 
the base material for the illegal drug, and the production of illegal drugs by mixing 
chemicals and the base product in clandestine labs.  Eradication is the only way to 
eliminate illegally cultivated crops.  However, the eradication process requires that some 
attention be paid to developing alternative crop production so that the local people have a 
legitimate means to reasonably support themselves.  Illegal crop production is one of a 
very few ways to make money in these countries.  Conventional governments should 
offer more to their citizens than criminals do.  People within the production zone should 
be enabled to make similar profits by raising legitimate crops.  This, of course, can only 
come through education and the use of modern developed techniques of cultivation.  One 
look at the production zones in the world reveals that they are all located in 
underdeveloped countries.  Farmers in the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent 
simply do not have the techniques nor the support from the government to raise 
legitimate crops that are as lucrative as their opium crops. 
Clandestine cocaine or heroine labs will always exist as long as the production of 
the necessary base materials continues.  Morphine base is the natural derivative produced 
from the opium poppy to make heroin.  Cocaine base is also a natural product produced 
from coca plants to make cocaine.  However, these base materials are not the only 




chemicals that have to be mixed with the base to produce the actual drug.  For example, 
for heroin it is acetic acid anhydride, which is a precursor that is conventionally used in 
detergents and similar products.  In contrast with morphine base, acetic acid anhydride is 
mostly produced in developed Western states and trafficked in the opposite direction: 
from west to east.  This creates a controversial situation.  While Western states are the 
biggest consuming countries, they continue to produce chemicals vital for the drugs that 
threat their own societies.  Even though they are produced for lawful purposes, these 
chemicals are easily diverted to illegal channels, and consequently smuggled to 
production zones. 
Due to financial concerns, many producing Western countries do not agree with 
proposals that advocate placing these chemical under the same level of control as hard 
drugs.  Besides this governmental reluctance, producers of these essential precursors fail 
to create an effective control mechanism that would allow them to monitor and strictly 
regulate the purchase, distribution, and use of the precursor chemicals.  This situation 
should be remedied.  Every processor chemical used in the production of illegal drugs 
should be treated the same way illegal drugs are treated in national and international law.  
Countries that produce those chemicals should be as sensitive to these chemicals as they 
are to illegal drugs that have capacity to obliterate their own social institutions. 
Successful combat against the trafficking of illegal drugs requires long term 
commitment, well-organized agencies, and effective cooperation.  Long term 
commitments should consist of long term plans, and should utilize organizations that are 




large-scale local drug dealers are different than regular criminals.  Because of the huge 
profits derived from the sale of drugs, they are able to use every means of technology 
available, regardless of the cost to avoid police interference.  Many law enforcement 
agencies around the world are provided by technological devices used for surveillance, 
communication, and combat well after drug traffickers have the same capabilities.  In 
some cases, these agencies will never have comparable technologies simply because it is 
so difficult to compete with the financial resources of drug traffickers.  However, when 
the future of the country is at stake, every possible means should be used to overcome the 
problem. 
Another obstacle that weakens and even makes it impossible to defeat drug 
traffickers is the corruption of government officials.  This obstruction pollutes the state’s 
own legitimacy.  Without legal-rational authority, the state has no foundation to stand 
upon to fight against outlaws.  Corruption, therefore, must be eliminated at every level.  
This elimination process requires a strict enforcement of the countries laws, vigilant 
preservation of is institutions, morally upright personal, and of course, financial power. 
International cooperation is a vital element in the fight against illicit drug 
trafficking.  Creating an international community that is sensitive to the issue and aware 
of the seriousness of the problem is the first requirement of this international cooperation. 
Since drugs are a world-wide problem, no single country can successfully combat the 
problem without the help of the others.  This help may take different forms: information 
exchange, financial aid, joint operations, international laws, signed treaties, appointed 




Information must be exchanged immediately.  Due to long bureaucratic 
procedures, vital information often arrives well after it is needed.  For an effective 
international cooperation, a rapid information exchange system is critical.  States that are 
willing to cooperate should regulate their internal procedures to avoid bureaucratic 
obstacles.   
As discussed earlier, some countries may have financial difficulties in dealing 
with illicit drug trafficking.  The donation of money, equipment, and training to 
legitimate law enforcement agencies that are located in crucial positions among drug 
trafficking networks would benefit everyone.  However, strict control of these resources 
must be maintained to ensure that they are used in the way that they are intended.  It is no 
small task to exercise this control without offending the receiving countries. 
Good training programs that are prepared by experienced and financially powerful 
countries are important instruments in the fight against illicit drug trafficking.  These 
programs give officers around the world the opportunity to share their experiences, learn 
new techniques, and familiarize themselves with recent developments in equipment 
technology.  The sole purpose of these training programs should be to strengthen 
cooperation and prepare law enforcement officers to efficiently combat drug trafficking.  
Host countries should have no ulterior motives.  The use of these training programs to 
advance their own political agendas would only perpetuate division, thereby weakening 
the allies while strengthening the enemy. 
International treaties, such as “The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 




Psychotropic Substances” are the engines that facilitate efficient international 
cooperation.  Although many countries have signed such treaties and manage to have 
them ratified by their legislatures, there are still states that either have not signed the 
treaty or have them signed but have not ratified them.  The international community 
should put pressure on such countries to be a part on these crucially important treaties.  
The countries that have signed the treaties should make necessary regulations in 
accordance with the responsibilities that are imposed by these treaties. 
Since the United States is the only remaining super power in the world, a careful 
evaluation of its drug policies is necessary.  US foreign policy regarding illicit drug-
control is a manifestation of its tough national drug-control policy.  This national policy 
encompasses many severe sanctions and zero-tolerance applications, including the use of 
mandatory minimums and asset forfeiture.  The US drug policy is also discriminatory 
towards racial and ethnic minorities.  Since there is no positive evidence that indicates the 
usefulness, adequacy, or success of this harsh policy, applying this policy internationally 
would not bring about a different outcome.  America has the potential to lead the global 
community in multinational joint operations, but equal participation is essential in order 
to achieve success.  In these operations, governments and international organizations 
should determine their goals and criteria for success very clearly before initiating any 
program concerning the drug dilemma.  After an adequate time has passed following the 
implementation of the program, its outcomes should be closely monitored and evaluated.  
If the results do not meet the success criteria, these programs or strategies should be 




of other countries’ policies and strategies.  The US must be especially sensitive to 
countries containing production and transit zones.  Programs there must be analyzed with 
realistic criteria.  Their voluntary cooperation and active participation must be 
maintained.  An equitable, internationally cooperative effort will be the only way to 
achieve success against drug traffickers. 
Consumption is the last part of the narcotics problem.  Consumption here refers to 
the drug abuse problem.  New trends in world drug abuse do not promise a drug-free 
world in the near future.  The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) of the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations published a report detailing the world’s drug 
abuse situation.  This report examines data from many countries in an attempt to provide 
a global picture of new and emerging trends in drug abuse.  In 1999, the CND found that 
thirty-one countries in Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe reported increased abuse of 
heroin. Heroin abuse appears to have gradually risen in the United States of America 
since 1992.  An increase in the use of non-injecting modes of abuse, including smoking 
in Europe, and snorting in the United States, have also occurred with these higher levels 
of heroin abuse.  Thirty countries reported the rising abuse of amphetamine-type 
stimulants. Generally in Southeast Asia, particularly in Thailand, the rising trend in the 
abuse of methamphetamine formed a source of substantial concern.  The growing abuse 
of amphetamines is also reported in many countries of the European Union. 
An increasing number of countries report the existence of intravenous drug use 
(IDUs) and growing rates of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) among IDUs.  




the blunt of this burden, being greatly susceptible to drug abuse.  There is the potential 
for an epidemic of HIV among IDUs in the Russian Federation and surrounding 
countries.  An HIV outbreak is also likely to occur in Central and Eastern Europe as well 
as various Asian countries.  In some countries, Hepatitis C infections among IDUs and 
drug-related deaths due to drug overdose are also sources of new concerns (CND, 1999).   
The CND’s report, as disheartening and pessimistic as it may be, serves as a 
reminder of the urgency with which international cooperation against the drug trade must 
be undertaken.  Nations should not be lost in the debate over whether to prioritize the 
target against supply or demand.  Rather, equal importance should be given to both parts, 
and intelligent national and international action should be undertaken. 
Terrorism, the second dimension of the “narco-terrorism,” requires the same 
commitments that are needed in the fight against illegal drug trafficking.  As explained in 
the pervious chapters, there are several similarities between illegal drug trafficking 
organizations and terrorist organizations, and sometimes both evils may exist in the same 
organization, thus creating “narco-terrorism”. 
Terrorist organizations are not only threats to their own countries, they also 
constitute a great threat the stability of world peace.  Terrorism, therefore, is an 
international issue.  Effective international cooperation is vital to establish national and 
international security.  As with the drug phenomenon, rapid information exchange, 
financial aid, joint operations, international legislation, regular global meetings and 




However, terrorism is a more political issue than the drug dilemma. Terrorist 
organizations represent different political ideologies.  The all too familiar “your terrorist 
is my freedom fighter” phenomenon poses a major obstacle to international cooperation.  
Nevertheless, the recent terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City 
and the Pentagon in Washington, DC. have shown the huge impact that terrorist acts can 
have on global affairs.  The enormous bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians further 
emphasizes the global impact of terrorism.  Nations must find common ground in the 
fight against terrorism.  They must present a worldwide united front to prevent future 
attacks and save the lives of countless innocent civilians. 
Terrorism becomes even more devastating when it is combined with illicit drug 
trafficking.  Because of the giant financial potential of the illegal drug business, terrorist 
organizations are given the opportunity to equip themselves with more sophisticated and 
deadly weapons, including nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction.  To avoid 
the unthinkable consequences of such disasters, the bond between terrorist organizations 
and illegal drugs must be severed.  The best way of doing so is totally eliminate both 
threats; however this is not an easy task and can not be accomplished overnight.  
Consequently, it is best to go for the singular.  Cut the financial power of the terrorists.  
They simply cannot operate efficiently without money. 
 Today, almost all terrorist organizations realize that they need support from 
legitimate states and international organizations to achieve their goals.  Hence, they make 
it highest priority to disguise their politically and socially unacceptable operations.  By 




and subsequently conducting a broad campaign to make their supporters aware of their 
involvement, these terrorist groups will lose their credibility.  In short, evidence can be 
presented to make supporters aware that “their freedom fighter is my narco-terrorist.” 
Lastly, many of the terrorist organizations originate in repressive countries with 
little or no democracy.  The ideology behind their insurrection is closely related to their 
oppressive governmental policies, restricted freedom, and the inequitable treatment of the 
people by state agents and agencies.  In same cases, terrorist organizations may also be 
created in democratic countries.  These groups take advantage of their freedom and they 
are frequently supported by governments who oppose their democratic state. Nonetheless, 
the rise of terrorist groups with democratic countries is rare.   
The total elimination of terrorism, an admittedly utopian approach, can only be 
accomplished by establishing democracy fully in every nation, and overcoming every 
destructive and malevolent ideology that exist.  In order to bring this utopia to reality, 
together the free counties of the world must wholeheartedly and unabashedly strive to 
meet ultimate goal of ending violence caused by terrorism and ending enslavement 
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